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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM
Mohamed Mehdi Rahoui
Old Dominion University, 2016
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand

The equity risk premium (ERP) is an essential component of any asset pricing model
both for academics and practitioners alike. Nevertheless, the financial literature does not accord
much attention to the ERP estimation issues (Damodaran, 2015). The first chapter of this
dissertation gives a summary of the recent literature review on the subject of the ERP. The
second chapter explores four of the most commonly cited models in literature for estimating the
ERP: the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model (HMRRM), the Dividend Discount Model
(DDM), the Free Cash Flow Model (FCFM), and the Sharpe Ratio Model (SRM). The results
indicate that the estimates of the ERP vary considerably depending on (a) the variable of choice
for the risk free rate; (b) the selection and the length of the estimation period; (c) and the
estimation method. The DDM and the FCFM produce estimates for the implied ERP that are
below the historical estimates, while the SRM produces implied ERP values that are usually
higher than the historical values of the ERP. The post 2008 financial crisis period produces
estimates for the historical ERP that are slightly higher or lower than the implied ERP estimates
for the FCFM. The implied ERP estimates for the three models are more volatile than the
historical ERP. In particular, estimates of the implied ERP from the SRM tend to overshoot the
historical ERP estimates during periods of high volatility and fall below the historical level
during periods of low stock market volatility.

The third chapter explores the relationship between the expected ERP and
macroeconomic variables. The results from the four OLS regressions indicate that the
relationship between the expected ERP and the unexpected inflation volatility is in general
negative and insignificant even after accounting for recessionary periods. The results validate the
Proxy Hypothesis theory of Fama. On the other hand, the expected ERP is found to be positively
correlated with the stock market volatility in times of non-recessionary periods but negatively
correlated in times of recessionary periods.
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1
CHAPTER I
ITRODUCTIO

The equity risk premium (ERP) is an essential component of any asset pricing model both for
academics and practitioners alike. The prediction of the ERP has strong repercussions on the
estimation of the cost of capital for firms. It is an important determinant of the measure of risk
aversion and by consequence the asset allocation decisions for investors. Its magnitude affects
the consumption and saving decisions of households and governments’ expenditures. Its
importance has far-reaching implications for the strength of the economy. Hall (2014) argued
that the high level ERP reduced investments and prevented hiring post 2008 financial crisis.
Kuehn, Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013) concluded that the ERP is countercyclical and tied to
fluctuations in the labor market.

Theoretically, the ERP is the return on equity in excess of the risk-free rate. Since future equity
market returns are not discernible at the current time, it is the expected ERP that investors are
concerned with. As intuitive as the concept of ERP seems, in practice it does present a number of
challenges.

VARIATIO I EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

Among academics, there are striking differences to what the ERP value actually is. Values vary
from as low as 2 percent to as high as 13 percent (Welch, 2000). According to Damodaran
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(2013), the wide variation in the estimates of the ERP could be explained by variation in sample
period, variation in variables measurement, and variation in measurement techniques.

Variation in Sample Period

The questions that academics face is how far back in time one should go to estimate the ERP.
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2005) go as far back as 1792 to estimate an ERP of 3.76 percent
between 1792 and 1925. Ibbotson Associates (2011) estimates go as far back as 1926. Other
academics consider much shorter time periods ranging from thirty, twenty, or even ten years to
estimate the ERP. Both sides have their rationales in selecting the time periods. Proponents of
the longer time periods approach, argue for more data inclusiveness and therefore better
predictability. However doing so will most likely generate estimates of the ERP that are less
relevant to today’s investors since market structures change over such a long period of time. In
addition, data from earlier periods are much less reliable compared to more recent periods. On
the other side, proponents of the shorter time periods approach argue that investors’ risk aversion
changes over time in relation to economic conditions and therefore shorter time periods will
yield a more updated and adequate estimates of the ERP that are more aligned with the investors’
risk aversion. Nonetheless, the disadvantage of such shorter time period approach is an increase
in data volatility and therefore higher standard errors associated with the ERP estimates.
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Variation in Variables Measurement

The ERP is the difference between the return on equities and the risk free rate. Whereas, the S&P
500 composite price index is often chosen as the market index that approximates for the return
on equities, first because it is a much broader index and second because it is a market value
weighted index. There is a debate among academics to what class of security better approximates
for the risk free rate. A good number of academics use the Treasury bill yield as the risk free
rate, while others use the Treasury bond yield. Those who favor the use of the Treasury bill do so
because it is free from price risk, while the Treasury bond has a longer maturity period and
therefore changes in interest rates can affect its value over time. Even if this argument does
make sense over a single investment period, it does ignore the reinvestment risk associated with
rolling over investment in Treasury bill over longer periods (Damodaran 2008). Conversely,
individuals who invest for their retirement do so over a long period of time and therefore they are
more likely to select the Treasury bond as the risk free rate to better approximate for the risk free
used to compute the expected return on their investment.

Even if academics do agree on the nature of the risk free rate, they still have to find a consensus
on whether to use a real or nominal risk free rate to calculate the ERP. The obvious argument is
that since long term return on equity, in most part, is calculated using a real discount rate to
account for changes in inflation rate, it makes sense to use a real risk free rate to estimate the
ERP. In this case, the expected inflation rate can be subtracted from the nominal interest rate to
arrive to the real risk free rate. Recently with the introduction of the Treasury Inflation Protected
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Security, academics have for the first time access to a traded default-free security that can be
used to proxy for the real risk free rate.

Variation in Measurement Techniques

The choice between the arithmetic mean and the geometric mean is the next decision in line that
academics face before they can calculate the ERP. The arithmetic mean is simply the sum of all
the returns over the period divided by the count of all the returns. Assuming a single period asset
pricing model and uncorrelated returns over time, the arithmetic mean is the best approach for
estimating the ERP. This approach loses its ground when we consider the fact that stocks are
negatively correlated over a long period of time (Fama and French 1988, 1992), and using the
arithmetic mean in this case will most likely overstate the risk premium (Damodaran 2013).
Therefore, the geometric mean is a better fitting approach for estimating the ERP over a longer
period of time and when stocks are correlated over time.

In the second chapter, I estimate the ERP over different horizons while approximating the risk
free rate to a number of variables with different maturity periods. I consider the 3-Month
Treasury Bill yield (TB), the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB10), the 30-Year
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB30), the 10-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security
constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security constant
maturity rate (TBI30).

5
ESTIMATIO OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

Damodaran (2015) lists three main approaches for estimating the ERP. The first and the most
widely used among academics and estimation services such as Ibbotson Associates is the
historical premium approach. It consists of estimating the expected ERP by assessing the
historical premium of past returns on equities over risk free assets. The second approach is a
survey based approach that consists of surveying a sample of managers and investors about their
future expectation for the ERP. The third approach is what Damodaran calls the “implied
premium” approach, and it consists of estimating the ERP based on the value of traded assets
today.

Duarte and Rosa (2015) classified the twenties’ models selected for their study into five main
approaches based on their underlying assumptions. They are: historical mean of realized returns
approach, dividend discount models approach, cross-sectional regressions approach, time-series
regressions approach and surveys based approach. In the next chapter, I estimate the historical
ERP using four different models: the historical mean of realized returns model, the dividend
discount model, the free cash flow model, and the sharp ratio model. In addition I test and
compare the predictability power of each of the four models.

UEXPECTED IFLATIO AD THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

The substantial variation of the ERP over the past two centuries is an indication that it may be
subject to the underlying macroeconomic forces. Barro (2006) argued that during wartime the
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perceived increase in the probability of future economic disaster led to a decrease in the real
interest rates and an increase in actual and expected level of inflation rates. He observed that the
expected U.S. real interest rates fell during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and more
recently during the period of 2001 – 2005 following the attacks of September 11 through the
conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq where the ten-year real rate fell from 3.8 percent to 1.6 percent.
Moreover, and according to Barro, bonds tend to outperform stocks during periods of economic
disaster which leads to an increase in the magnitude of the ERP.

Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2007) found a strong correlation between low frequency
movements in macroeconomic volatility and low frequency movements in the stock market. In
particular, they noticed that the sharp increase in the stock market during 1990s coincided with a
move toward lower macroeconomic risk that led to a fall in expected future stock returns and a
lower ERP after 1990. Their model predicted that the magnitude of the ERP plummets as the
economy gears toward a state of low macroeconomic volatility.

In the third chapter, I explore the relationship between the ERP and macroeconomic variables. In
particular, I postulate that an increase in uncertain inflation increases the market risk premium.
This increase in the market risk premium leads to an increase in the required rate of return on
stocks, which in turn causes the stock prices to decline.

7
LITERATURE REVIEW

Song (2007) identified “three major themes in the intellectual history of the equity premium.”
The first theme emerged with the paper of Gordon and Shapiro (1956) in which they argued for
the use of the dividend discount model (DDM) to estimate the required return on capital as the
dividend yield plus the expected dividend growth rate. The ERP can therefore be calculated by
subtracting the risk free rate from the required return on capital. The DDM was the prevalent
approach for estimating the ERP among practitioners and academics up to 1976 when Ibbotson
and Sinquefield proposed a new estimation approach for the ERP based on the historical returns.

The second theme started with the Ibbotson and Sinquefield paper (1976). It consisted of
estimating the arithmetic mean of the ERP from the historical returns of equity minus the risk
free rate. The authors operated under the assumption that historical returns are stationary and
therefore the appropriate length of time from which to estimate the ERP is the longest period of
quality reliable historical data available. Ibbotson and Sinquefield’s approach dominated the
practitioners’ estimates of the ERP from the late 1970s up to 1985 when it came under pressure
from both the DDM and the ERP puzzle literature.

Mehra and Prescott (1985) started the third theme in the intellectual history of the equity
premium by arguing that ERP estimate based upon Ibbotson and Sinquefield’s approach for the
period 1889–1978 required an investor risk aversion of 30 to 40 times higher than the prevalent
risk aversion in the market. In addition the historical ERP estimate for the same period was too
high to be explained by any of the models describing investors’ behavior at that time. Mehra and
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Prescott (1985) concluded that either the models were flawed or investors had received higher
returns than they expected.

Ever since 1985 when Mehra and Prescott made the first attempt to answer the question whether
the observed ERP is compatible with the theoretical ERP, many more academics have followed
in their steps trying to resolve what is commonly referred to in the financial literature as the ERP
puzzle. The attempts that followed can be classified into two main approaches. The first
approach is the focus of the majority of research and tries to justify the size of the equity
premium. The second approach focuses rather on explaining why investors have historically
realized a larger premium than they might have. In the next sections I give a brief summary of
the literature review for both approaches. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of the literature for the
ERP.
[Insert Figure 1 here]

Justifying the Equity Risk Premium

Ever since Mehra and Prescott introduced their famous paper “The Equity Premium a Puzzle” in
1985, a large number of studies have attempted to theoretically justify the size of the premium.
Nevertheless, to this day there is no absolute consensus for a dominant theory over the rest of
theories. In fact the only consensus in the field is that the ERP is still a puzzle as it was three
decades ago (Mehra and Prescott 2008). Among the pioneers of the justifying approach are;
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A Preferences Explanation

An intuitive explanation for the ERP is that a risk-averse investor demands a higher reward for
bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk. Mehra & Prescott (2008) estimate that historically the
standard deviation associated with returns on equity is around 20 percent per annum, while the
standard deviation associated with returns on Treasury-bills is only about 4 percent per annum.
Therefore, investing in more risky asset commands a higher reward. Such explanation suffers
from three perspectives: First, the low average debt security is not entirely a risk free asset as
argued by DeLong and Magin (2009). Second, assuming that a low average debt is a risk free
asset, the existence of such a high equity premium can only be explained by an extremely and
unrealistically high degree of risk aversion. Dasgupta (2007) puts the coefficient of relative risk
aversion to be in the range of 1 to 3, against a coefficient of 50 that is needed to explain the
presence of the ERP. Third, Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that under the same economic
circumstances, stocks and bonds reward investors in a very similar way. In fact, they estimated
that stocks on average should command no more than 1 percent return premium over bills.

A on-Standard Preferences Explanation

Separating Risk and Time Preferences

Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991, 2001) formulated an intertemporal utility model that disentangles
the risk aversion from the intertemporal substitution and allows for a temporal non-expected
utility to influence the consumer risk behavior. In such a setting the undiversifiable risk
component of the return is captured by the covariance of an individual asset’s return with the
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market portfolio, while the covariance of the individual asset’s return with the consumption
growth rate captures the risk across time periods.

Bansal, and Yaron (2004) presented a model with two main features. First, following on the
footsteps of Epstein and Zin (1989), their model allows for a separation between the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion. Second, the individual consumption and
the dividend growth rates are subject to irregular volatility, which captures time-varying
economic uncertainty. Based on these assumptions, individuals will demand a large equity risk
premia every time they are faced with a reduction in economic growth prospects or a rise in
economic uncertainty.

Kallenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) relying on the time preference assumptions of Epstein and
Zin (1989), studied the effects of transitory and permanent technology shocks on the long-run
risk associated with an individual asset’s return. Their results are summarized in two parts. First,
they show that a model with transitory technology shocks and a low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution will result in a low volatility of consumption growth and a high price of risk. The
end result is a large ERP but a highly volatile risk free rate. Second, they demonstrate that a
model with permanent technology shocks and a relatively high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution will produce a relative stable consumption growth rate and a high price of risk. The
end result is a low ERP.

The underlying critique to the time preference models is that they do leave high effective risk
aversion largely unaccounted for, see for example DeLong and Magin (2007). In addition such
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attempts are only able to explain the ERP puzzle if they account for an extremely large
coefficient of relative risk aversion and an economic agent that is implausibly risk-averse (see for
example Donaldson and Mehra (2008)).

on- Separable Utility Functions or Habit Formation

Sundaresan (1989) is pioneered for developing a model with a utility function that depends not
only on consumption level at time t but also on the history of consumption up to time t. In
theory, the existence of large ERP is only justified if the agent faces a large volatility in his or
her per capita consumption growth or historically the agent has faced a very low volatility in his
or her per capita consumption growth. By incorporating a habit consumption feature, the agent is
no longer assumed to be averse to consumption variation but to variations in habit-adjusted
levels of consumption. Such agent may require a large equity premium even if he or she faces a
small change in consumption growth. Such variation may explain the ERP puzzle (see, e.g.,
Donaldson and Mehra (2008)).

Similarly, Constantinides (1990) argued that utility is not time separable but exhibits habit
persistence. He justified the existence of the ERP in the presence of a low risk aversion element
by developing a model characterized with high volatility in the marginal rate of substitution in
consumption and low variability in the consumption growth rate. As such, a small drop in
consumption generates a large drop in the marginal rate of substitution that is able to justify the
observed ERP.
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Campbell and Cochrane (1999) developed a “consumption-based model” with three distinctive
features. First, the model assumes that individuals are subject to an external habit formation as
opposed to internal habit formation. The individual habits are linked to the history of aggregate
consumption (external) rather than to the individual’s own past consumption (internal). Second,
the relationship between the individual habits and the history of aggregate consumption exhibits
a nonlinear trend. The nonlinearity assumption implies that habit is always below consumption
level and that marginal utility is always finite and positive. Third, the individual habits react
slowly and gradually to the change in the level of consumption. As such, the Campbell and
Cochrane model is able to predict a large ERP even in the presence of low long-run consumption
volatility. The main argument behind Campbell and Cochrane results is that individuals require a
large premium because stocks do badly in times of economic contraction and not because stock
returns are correlated with reduction in the individual’s level of consumption or wealth.

Abel (2008) attempted to provide a closed-form solution to the ERP puzzle, first by adopting a
habit formation model for canonical asset, and second by departing from the assumption of
rational expectation. The end result was a generalized canonical asset pricing model capable of
delivering empirical results for the equity premium, the risk free rate, and the standard deviation
of the risk free rate that are close to the historical data and to the findings of Mehra and Prescott
(1985). Nevertheless, the Abel model does so at the expense of high risk free rate volatility.

Habit formation models are not anomalies free. Heaton (1995) explained that although the ERP
puzzle can be explained under the assumptions of the habit formation models, they do so at the
expense of a highly volatile short-term interest rate which is contrary to the quite low volatility
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observed historically. Kocherlakota (1996) has shown that while it is true that habit formation
models are able to explain the ERP puzzle by breaking the direct link between stock returns and
temporary consumption level, they do so under the assumption that individuals are extremely
averse to marginal variation in consumption level whether it is internal or external. This
conclusion was echoed more recently by DeLong and Magin (2009) and Donaldson and Mehra
(2008) who asserted the lack of empirical evidence supporting the assumptions of the external
habit formation model.

Market Structure and Undiversifiable Risk Models Explanation

Limited Capital Market Participation

Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) explained that only a quarter of U.S. families own stocks. Therefore
it is not fitting to test for the ERP using aggregate consumption across families who own stocks
and those who do not own stocks. In fact, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) found that the aggregate
consumption of stockholders is not only more volatile but also more strongly correlated with
excess equity return than total consumption is. Nevertheless, the authors admit that their results
“cannot provide a complete resolution of the equity premium puzzle.”

Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) challenged the assumption of a representative consumer
which assumes that heterogeneous consumers are able to equalize their marginal rate of
substitution under the assumption of full-information economy. The authors challenged this
assumption by arguing that a stochastic discount factor (SDF) calculated as the weighted average
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of individual households’ marginal rate of substitution with low value of relative risk aversion
coefficient, as opposed to a SDF calculated as the per capita marginal rate of substitution, is able
to generate an equity premium that conforms to its historical value during the period 1982-1996.
The authors also argued that an SDF calculated as the per capita marginal rate of substitution is
better able to explain the equity premium once the assumption of limited participation of
households in the capital market is recognized.

Market Incompleteness

Constantinides and Duffie (1996) relied on the joint hypothesis of incomplete consumption
insurance and consumer heterogeneity in order to construct a theoretical model where the source
of the equity premium is measured by the covariance of the securities’ returns with the crosssectional variance of individual consumers’ consumption growth. The authors argued that the
joint hypothesis of incomplete consumption insurance and consumer heterogeneity provides an
explanation for the ERP even without introducing borrowing constraints, short-sale restrictions,
borrowing costs, transaction costs, or an unrealistic restriction on the net supply of bonds. The
findings of Constantinides and Duffie (1996) come with the price of restricting the joint
processes of dividends, aggregate income, and prices under the property of convex marginal
utility.
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Borrowing Constraints Models

Huggett (1993) suggested that the source of puzzle in the ERP emanates from the fact that the
average real risk-free rate has been so low, an observation commonly termed the "risk-free rate
puzzle". The argument is that economic agents are constrained to how much they can borrow but
they are not constrained to how much they can save. The end result, a low risk free rate is needed
in order to clear the excess reserves in the credit market.

Transaction Cost Models

Fisher (1994) argued that the equity premium should compensate an investor for the (1) risk
bearing factor and also for the (2) trading cost incurred. Contrary to the general belief that
transaction costs and aspects of trading volume are to be ignored in the asset pricing model for
estimating returns on equity, Fisher (1994) asserted that even in the presence of a negligible risk
aversion, the gross expected premium should average between 3 percent and 4 percent annually.
Therefore in the presence of trading cost the ERP carries (1) a risk rewarding component and (2)
a compensation for trading cost component.

Heaton and Lucas (1995) broadly surveyed the related literature to conclude that models with
frictions in the form of borrowing constraints, transaction costs, and undiversifiable risk “can
account for low-risk free rate and in some cases can explain the observed ERP.” Nevertheless,
the authors were quick to point out that their results suggest that much remains to be explained
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and that the ERP is far from being completely resolved by the introduction of frictions in to the
asset pricing models.

Heaton and Lucas (1996) assumed that individuals face systematic labor income risk and
idiosyncratic labor income risk. Individuals trade in financial securities in hope of dissipating
these risks. Nevertheless the ability of individuals to trade in financial securities is limited by
borrowing constraints, short-sales constraints, and transaction costs. In particular the effect of
transaction costs is amplified by the fact that individuals have to trade often in order to hedge
against shocks to their individual incomes. The authors argued that the effect of the transaction
costs on equity premium can be decomposed in two parts. First, a direct effect as a result of the
gap between the higher rates that the lenders require and the lower rates that the borrowers
require in order to compensate for transactions costs. Second, an indirect effect related to the fact
that transaction costs limit the ability of individuals to use financial securities as a mean of
protection against transitory shocks in individual consumption. The authors find that the indirect
effect alone of transactions cots is approximately responsible for 20 percent of the observed
equity premium. Nevertheless, the authors conceded that their results are “quite sensitive to the
structure of transaction costs and the supply of tradable assets”.

Swan (2002) argued that equity markets are highly illiquid relative to government securities. The
investors then require a higher compensation rate of return for holding such illiquid market
securities. According to Swan, the equity premium is no more than compensation to equity
holders for the illiquidity. Swan constructed a model were the equity premium depends on the
amortized spread for equity less the amortized spread for Treasury bills after accounting for the
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transaction costs. The liquidity variable is approximated by the average turnover rate which is
the ratio of securities traded relative to securities outstanding. Swan’s results indicated that
annualized security returns decrease at a rate of 0.54 percent for every 1 percent increase in
equity turnover. The results also demonstrated that the turnover rate for bonds is 25 percent
higher than the turnover rate for stocks. According to Swan, the liquidity differential between
bonds and stocks is more than enough to account for the observed equity premium.

Jones (2002) estimated the annual proportional cost of aggregate equity by multiplying the
annual turnover to the sum of half-spreads and one way weighted-average commission rate for
trading NYSE. The results revealed that measures of liquidity in the form of bid-ask spreads and
turnover rates are able to predict stock returns one year ahead. In particular, Jones showed
evidences that high spreads predict high returns and high turnover predicts low returns.
Nevertheless, the results fell short of solving the ERP puzzle. In fact, Jones’s results indicated
that the annual proportional cost of aggregate equity trading can only account for a small part of
the observed equity premium.

Income Structure Models

Danthine, Donaldson, and Siconolfi (2005) argued that the variation in income shares between
workers and capital owners represent an important risk factor for the owners of capital and a
fundamental determinant of the return to equity. The non-competitive labor market as a result of
political pressure through the tax systems and social forces in the form of trade unions, influence
the sharing of income in the favor of workers vis-à-vis the owners of capital. The owners of
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capital are required to share in value added even when their cash flows are limited. This
“distribution risk”, as called by the authors, is of a great importance to the holders of capital, and
it even exceeds the usual systematic risk of financial assets. As a consequence, the owners of
capital require a substantial higher return on their investment that according to the authors is able
to explain a high equity premium of 3.12 percent and in some instance 7.78 percent with high
level of dividends volatility.

Guvenen (2005) proposed two assumptions for explaining the ERP puzzle. First is the
assumption of limited participation in the stock market, where the majority of households do not
participate in the stock market but have access to a risk-free bond and are able to accumulate
wealth and smooth consumption intertemporally. The second assumption is related to the
heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The combination of these two
assumptions leads to a different growth in wealth distribution among the two categories of
economic agents (households and stockholders) and over the different business cycle of the
economy. For example, a positive and persistent technological shock increases the value of
equity considerably and as a result the wealth of the stockholders. On the other hand, nonstockholders rely on a gradual increase in wages to accumulate more wealth. Therefore, because
of the asymmetry in consumption smoothing opportunity, non-stockholders develop a stronger
desire for a smooth consumption process compared to stockholders. In addition and for the same
reasons, non-stockholders have to rely exclusively on the bond market in order to avoid high
consumption volatility and will therefore demand a high equity premium in order to participate
in the stock market. The analytical results of Guvenen (2005) showed an equity premium of 5.45
percent compared to the historical figure of 6.2 percent.
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Beyond One Representative Agent Models

Chan and Kogan (2002) adopt a representative agent model with heterogeneous agents with
constant individual risk aversion over time but variable across different segments of population.
As such, the adopted representative agent model will generate an aggregate risk premium with
countercyclical variation due to the endogenous disparity in wealth distribution across the
different segments of economic agents. In particular, the segment of economic agents with
relatively low risk aversion will require a higher ERP than the segment of agents with relatively
high risk aversion. In fact, relatively “risk tolerant agents” will hold a higher proportion of their
wealth in stocks compared to relatively less “risk tolerant agents”. Therefore, relatively risk
tolerant agents are more susceptible to wealth reduction due to a decline in the stock market than
less risk tolerant agents. By consequence, a decline in the stock prices will result in a higher
ERP. Empirically, Chan and Kogan (2002) found enough evidence to support their assumption
of preference heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the authors also concede that “changes in expected
stock returns in the model are still partly driven by the time varying interest rates.”

Piazzesia, Schneidera, and Tuzel (2007) develop a consumption based asset pricing model where
economic agents consider housing both as an asset and as consumption good. As such, an
investor measures risk not only based on the overall size of future consumption but also on its
uncertain composition between housing as an asset and other consumption. In other words, an
investor will not only consider the intratemporal elasticity between present and future
consumption but also will have to consider the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
housing and other consumption. This intratemporal substitution mechanism drives stock price

20
down in times of recession by forcing investors to sell stocks today in order to secure present
consumption. In particular, when the share of housing consumption is low, the recession is
perceived to be severe and the downward effect on stock prices is accentuated. Empirically the
model generates a sizeable 3.5 percent ERP with a low and smooth riskless rate with a mean of
1.8 percent.

Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2008) study asset pricing models with non expected utility
hypothesis. In particular they consider rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU), disappointment
aversion (DA) and generalized disappointment aversion (GDA), ambiguity aversion (AA), and a
general form of reference-dependent utility to contrast assets’ prices in a heterogeneous economy
composed of two equally wealthy agents but with different first-order risk aversion to a
homogenous economy composed of a single agent with a wealth equal to the weighted average
of the utility parameters of the two equally wealthy agents. Their results show that the single
agent model tends to overstate the equity premium and understate the value of risk free rate by
100 percent and 20 percent respectively, as compared to the two agent model. The authors argue
that in the presence of two representatives in the economy, the agent who is more pessimistic or
risk averse may decide not to bear any risk if he or she thinks that the risk premium is deemed
insufficiently high. In this situation, the risk premium will be defined primarily by the agent who
is more willing to take risk and therefore it is a mistake to equate between prices in the
heterogenous agent model and prices in the weighted average agent model.
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Behavioral Models

Prospect Theory

Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the authors criticized the utility theory model and its
inconsistency in explaining choices under risky prospects. In particular the authors noted that
economic agents tend to overweigh outcomes that are considered certain in comparison to
outcomes that are merely probable. This “certainty effect” as labeled by the authors contradicts
the principle of utility theory where utilities outcomes are weighted by their probabilities. In
addition, the authors observed that economic agents more often discount components that are
shared by all prospects in favor of components that distinguish them. They labeled this
phenomenon the isolation effect which may produce inconsistent preferences away from the
predictions of the utility theory. The authors then developed an alternative model called the
prospect theory where they assign values to gains and losses rather than to final assets and where
they consider decision weights rather than probabilities.

Disappointment and Generalized Disappointment Aversion Theory

Gul (1991) developed an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries that relies on
countercyclical risk aversion and where consumers are concerned particularly with disappointing
outcomes. Consumers tend to react aversely when their level of realized consumption is expected
to fall below a certain predetermined level. The significance of the Disappointment Aversion
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model is that it retains much of the expected utility theory while being immune to the most
compelling argument of independence axiom against the expected utility theory.

Routledge and Zin (2010) generalized the Disappointment Aversion model of Gul (1991) by
introducing a more relaxed definition of the endogenous disappointment outcomes that allows
for focuses on more extreme outcomes. Such an outcome is considered to be a disappointing
outcome not when it falls below a certain predetermined acceptable level by the economic agent,
but rather when it is far below the confidence threshold of the agent. This introduced property of
the Generalized Disappointment Aversion model, allowed the authors to focus on more extreme
financial behavior. As such, the authors’ model was able to produce a sizeable equity premium
measure and a risk free rate with low volatility.

Loss Aversion Theory

Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), deviating from the traditional utility theory, the authors
incorporate two well known ideas in psychology: the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and the evidence of Thaler and Johnson (1990) on the influence of prior outcomes on the
individual risk behavior, to develop a model capable of explaining the ERP puzzle. The prospect
theory stipulates that the economic agent is more sensitive to changes in the value of his financial
wealth from period to period rather than the absolute level or the final consumption outcomes.
According to the prospect theory, the agent is also more sensitive to reductions in his financial
wealth than to increases. In addition, the evidence of Thaler and Johnson (1990) indicates that
prior gains and loses outcomes influence the risk behavior of the economic agent. In particular,

23
an agent may find a fall in the stock market return to be less worrying if it is preceded by
substantial earlier increase in wealth that makes the investor believe that he is better off
compared to last period. According to Thaler and Johnson (1990), this finding explains why
agents who experienced recent gains behave in a less risk-averse manner. On the contrary, agents
who experienced recent losses tend to be much more risk-averse and tend to shy away from
investment that they may have considered without these prior loses. This behavior is known in
the financial literature as the “house money effect”. By incorporating these two concepts into
their model, the authors relate the high level of ERP to the high volatility of returns which leads
to frequent losses and consecutively these losses cause loss-averse investors to be even more
pessimistic. Therefore, a high equity premium is needed in order to convince loss-averse agents
to invest in stock markets.

arrow Framing Theory

Barberis and Huang (2001), assuming that economic agents are loss-averse and look at utility
from a narrow framing point of view, studied stock returns in two different economies. The first
economy was composed of agents that are loss averse over fluctuations of their entire stock
portfolio in addition to their consumption level. The second economy was composed of agents
that are loss averse over fluctuations of their individual stocks in addition to their consumption
level. Their results indicate that aggregate stock returns in an economy where agents get their
utility from fluctuations in individual stocks as opposed to the entire portfolio, have a high mean
return and are more volatile and reasonably predictable over time. In addition such economies
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experience a low and constant risk free rate over time. Their results point to the fact that
investors’ mental accounting behavior can play a key role in explaining the relatively high ERP.

Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) built on the concept of “narrow framing” that was first used
by Kahneman and Lovallo in 1993, to develop a utility theory capable of explaining to a certain
extent the ERP puzzle. The authors departed from the traditional utility theories who define the
utility of the individual outcome in relation to the total wealth or consumption of the economic
agent to a more narrowed approach that define utility directly from the individual outcome and
independently from its contribution to total consumption or total wealth.

In relation to the ERP, the authors argue that in general even though stock markets appear to
have relatively high mean return, many economic agents shy away from investing in them. This
non participation stimulates from the fact that economic agents evaluate the outcome of the stock
market risk independently from their other important risks such as labor income risk, proprietary
income risk, and house price risk. Based on this observation, the authors argue that a first order
risk aversion theory that allows for narrow framing is well suited to explain the rejection by
economic agents to add even a relatively small uncorrelated stock market risk to their other risks
and therefore generating a large ERP.

Barberis and Huang (2008) surveyed the financial literature for the loss aversion and narrow
framing approach to the ERP puzzle solving. The authors concluded that models that integrate
the loss aversion and the narrow framing concepts in framing the investor’s utility function tend

25
to generate a high equity premium, a low and stable risk-free rate and a low correlation between
stock returns and consumption growth.

Happiness Maintenance Preferences Theory

Falato (2009) expended the standard asset pricing model of Mehra and Prescott (1985) to
incorporate the concept of “happiness maintenance”. Falato started from the assumption that
agents who feel happy are more risk averse than agents who feel neutral. As a result of this
assumption, investing in equity is more risky for an economic agent with happiness maintenance
preferences. Therefore there is a need for higher return on risky assets in order to induce the
happy agent to invest in equity.

Explaining the Equity Risk Premium

Adherents to the “explaining approach” on the other side do not attempt to theoretically justify
the ERP but rather strive to explain why investors have historically realized high premium.
Among the pioneers of the explaining approach are;

Market Crash and Survivorship Models

Rietz (1988) demonstrated that by accounting for market crashes that are plausible, severe, and
not too improbable, an Arrow-Debreu asset pricing model is capable of explaining a high ERP
and a low risk–free returns. Rietz’s explanation is that with the assumption of credible, severe,
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but unlikely market crashes, risk-averse equity investors will demand a high return to
compensate for the extreme losses they may incur. These plausible, severe but unlikely market
crashes led to a historical high equity returns even in the absence of such events. Numerically
and under the assumption of a severe market crash where output may fall to one-half of its
normal expected value with a probability of occurrence ranging from 0.0008 to 0.0030, and a
risk-aversion parameter between 5.30 and 7.05, Rietz’s model was able to generate an ERP
ranging from 5.92 to 6.38 percent with a risk free rate within the range of 0.73 to 0.89 percent.

Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) observed that out of a sample of 39 countries, the United States
had the highest real return on equity at 4.32 percent per annum compared to 0.75 percent per
annum for the entire sample. The authors advanced two explanations for this observation. The
first is that the high equity premium observed in the United States is a compensation for a higher
level of risk in comparison to the rest of the countries in the sample. Or, a measure of risk by
means of volatility indicated that at 16.2 percent volatility, the United States market does not
experience a particularly high risk when compared with other stock markets. This led the authors
to conclude that the high equity premium observed in the United States is the exception and it
does not seem to compensate for higher risk as measured by volatility. The second explanation
advanced by Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) for the high equity premium observed in the United
States is that of survivorship bias and a pricing of an infrequently occurring crash.

The

survivorship bias hypothesis suggests that the ex post observed equity returns in the United
States may be higher than their ex ante expectation just because the United States stock market is
a winner and is the only stock market in the sample without any break due to financial crises,
wars, expropriations, or political upheaval.
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Starting from the assumption that investors in the stock market tend to overreact to bad news in
good times and underreact to good news in bad times, Veronesi (2004) went on to test the Peso
Problem hypothesis which states: because no expected catastrophic event has ever materialized
during the sampling period ex post realized returns in the United States are high even if ex ante
expected returns are low. The simulation technique employed by Veronesi validates the
conformity of the United States stock market returns to the Peso Problem hypothesis.

Building on Rietz (1988) paper, Barro (2006) went on to measure the frequency and the size of
the international economic disasters, mainly World War I, the Great Depression, and World War
II, and their impact on stock market returns. His analysis indicated a disaster probability of 1.5 to
2 percent per year coupled with a decline in per capita GDP ranging between 15 to 64 percent.
He then constructed a model of the equity premium that extends Lucas (1978), Mehra and
Prescott (1985), and Rietz (1988) to incorporate rare but probable economic disasters in the
twentieth century. The model generated an average real rate of return of 0.071 for the G7
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., and U.S.), an average real bill return of
0.001, and consequently an equity premium around 7 percent.

The effect of macroeconomic variables

Fama and French (2002) suggested that the decline in the discount rates during the period 1951
to 2000 has produced a large unexpected capital gain and concluded that the average stock return
for the period in question is a lot higher than expected. In particular, they estimated the expected
real equity premium to be 3.54 percent per year using the dividend growth model and 5.57
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percent, 60 percent higher, using the average stock return model for the period 1872 to 2000.
They attributed the difference between the two measures to the high average stock return during
the period 1951 to 2000. In fact they calculated the equity premium for the period 1872 to 1950
to be 4.17 percent and 4.40 percent, only 5 percent higher, respectively for the dividend growth
model and the average stock return model. In contrast and for the period 1951 to 2000, the
dividend growth model generated an equity premium of 2.55 percent and the average stock
return model generated an equity premium of 7.43 percent. As a result of these findings, Fama
and French (2002) concluded that the observed high ERP during the period 1951 to 2000 is a lot
higher than expected and that is mainly due to the decline in discount rate during that same
period which produced a large unexpected capital gain.

Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2007) suggested that the ERP is strongly correlated with the
low-frequency movements in macroeconomic volatility both in the United States and
internationally. Specifically, periods of low macroeconomic risk in the form of low consumption
volatility generate low equity premium and periods of high macroeconomic risk engender large
equity premium. In particular, the authors suggested that if the economic agent perceives the
decline in the macroeconomic risk to be sufficiently long-lasting, he or she will demand a much
lower risk premium because he or she expects an increase in stock prices which explains the
boom in stock markets in Unites States during the 1990s.

Kyriacou et al. (2006) shed more light on the relationship between the macroeconomic
fundamentals and the ERP by arguing that over the past 132 years the size of the equity premium
has been positively related to the rate of inflation. In particular, the high inflationary period of
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post 1914 resulted in substantially higher equity premium compared to the relatively low
inflation period of pre 1914. The authors’ simulation model indicated that the average equity
premium post 1914 would have been only 4.61 percent and not 7.34 percent had the inflation rate
been zero. The authors theoretical explanation for the observed high equity premium during
inflationary periods is based on the fact the bonds tend to be a significantly poorer hedge against
inflation than stocks.

COCLUSIO

In conclusion, there is no one single theory that is better at explaining the ERP puzzle. Different
theories should be looked at as different pieces of the puzzle that collectively give us a better
answer as to why the observed ERP differ from the theoretical ERP. Damodaran (2015) stated
that “the risk premium is a fundamental and critical component in portfolio management,
corporate finance and valuation. Given its importance, it is surprising that more attention has not
been paid in practical terms to estimation issues.” In the next chapter, I take the challenge of
Damodaran and try to contribute to the literature of the estimation of the ERP in practical terms.
My research falls under the category of the explaining approach and focuses primarily on the
impact of macroeconomic variables, and principally the unexpected inflation, on the ERP.

Argues for bias in the historical data.

Tries to justify the size of the ERP.
Suggests improvements in the
macroeconomic model.

Focuses on explaining the size of ERP.

Explaining ERP Approach

The focus of the majority of research.

Justifying ERP Approach

The historical ERP estimate required a risk aversion of 30 to 40 (vs.
observed risk aversion of 1).

Prevalent approach for estimating the ERP among
practitioners and academics up to 1976 when Ibbotson and
Sinquefield proposed a new estimation approach based on
the historical returns.

Either models are flawed or investors have received a higher return
than expected.

Concluded that the historical ERP estimate of 1889–1978 was too
high to be explained by existing models.

Mehra and Prescott (1985)

Used the dividend discount model (DDM) to estimate the
required return on capital.

Gordon & Shapiro (1956)

Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1976)

Dominated the practitioners’ estimates of the ERP up to
1985 when it came under pressure from both the DDM
and the ERP puzzle literature.

Historical returns are assumed to be stationary.

Estimated the arithmetic mean of the ERP from the
historical returns of equity minus the risk free rate.

Figure 1. Timeline of the Literature for the ERP
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CHAPTER II
ESTIMATIO OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

DISCUSSIO

Conceptually, the equity risk premium (ERP) is the excess return required by investors for
holding risky assets. Reducing risky assets to equity, the ERP is then the excess return of a risky
stock market portfolio over the risk free rate. Since future market returns are not discernible at
the current time, it is the expected ERP that the investor is concerned with. Therefore,
mathematically, the equity risk premium is simply the difference between the expected return on
equity and the risk free rate and it can be stated as

ERPt = E ( Rt + n ) − Rt f+ n

(1)

where ERPt is the expected ERP at time t, E ( Rt + n ) is the expect return on equity over the period
[t , t+n], and Rt f+ n is the risk free rate over the same period [t , t+n]. As intuitive as this equation
seems, in practice it does present a number of challenges. First, investors have to decide what
constitutes a return on equity and how to estimate future expected returns. Even after reducing
risky assets to equity, investors still have to decide which stock market index best proxy for the
market return on equity. Some are price weighted indices, others are value or equal weighted
indices. In addition, different indices cover different ranges of stocks. Even after having decided
on the type of index, investors still have to choose among an array of models to estimate future
expected returns. The capital asset pricing model, the arbitrage pricing model, the multi-factor
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models, the proxy models, they all represent different approaches for estimating the return on
equity.

Second, investors have to decide which class of assets is free of default and liquidity risk and by
consequence is a best proxy for the risk free rate. Investors have to choose between short and
long term maturity, nominal versus real and inflation protected securities. Last and not least,
investors have to settle on period over which to estimate the ERP.

In this chapter I test and compare the following four models: historical mean of realized returns
model, dividend discount model, the free cash flow model, and the sharp ratio model.

MODELS AD VARIABLES COSTRUCTIO

Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model

The Historical Mean Realized Return Model (HMRRM) is the most widely applied model in
academia for estimating the ERP, and according to Welch and Goyal (2008) it is the best
predictor for out of sample estimates. It consists of finding the best linear historical estimates
under the assumption that excess returns are stationary overtime. Derrig and Orr (2005)
concluded that Ibbotson data for the period 1926 to 2002 is stationary. The obvious limitation of
the model is that it presumes that future excess returns behave like past excess returns.

The estimation procedure for ERP under the HMRRM is given by the following equation
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ERPt =

1 + Rt
−1
1 + Rt f

(2)

where ERPt is the equity risk premium at time t, Rt is the return on equity at time t, and Rt f is
the risk free rate at time t. ERPt is often approximated by the difference between return on
equity and the risk free rate.

ERPt = Rt − Rt f

(3)

The S&P 500 Composite Price Index (SP) is my proxy variable for the market return. The return
on equity (RE) is the value of the S&P 500 at time t divided by its value at time t-1 plus 1. The
risk free rate will be approximated using a number of variables with different maturity periods. I
consider the 3-Month Treasury Bill yield (TB), the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
(TB10), the 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB30), the 10-Year Treasury InflationIndexed Security constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed
Security constant maturity rate (TBI30). I calculate both the arithmetic and the geometric ERP.
All data is monthly. Table 1 gives a brief summary of the variables and their sources. Table 2
provides the summary statistics for the variables.
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Table 2 here]
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Dividend Discount Model

The Dividend Discount Models (DDM) use current market value to determine the ERP. As
stated by Gordon (1962), the value of a stock at time t is nothing other than the sum of expected
future cash flows for holding the stock, discounted at time t to account for the time value of the
money and the level of risk associated with the investment. Expected cash flows can arise from
dividend pay-outs, spin-offs, mergers, buy-backs, etc. In practice, most academics focus on
dividend pay-outs first because they constitute the bulk of cash flows, second because they are
readily available through financial disclosure, and third because they tend to grow at a relatively
constant rate over the long run (Duarte and Rosa 2015). As such we can express the price of the
stock at any point in time in the following way

∞

Pt = ∑
t =0

Dt +1
(1 + R) t +1

(4)

where Pt is the price of the stock at time t, Dt +1 is the expected dividend at time t+1, and R is the
discount rate that accounts for the time value of the money and the level of risk associated with
future expected dividends. It can be written as
R = R f + ERP

(5)

where R f is the risk free rate representing the time value of the money and ERP is the implied
ERP representing the level of risk associated with future expected dividends that equates the lefthand side to the right-hand side of equation (5). As such the implied ERP can be derived by
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subtracting the R f from the discount rate R that is calculated as the internal rate of return (IRR)
that equates the discounted value of expected future dividends to the price of the stock at time t.

The main advantage of the DDM is that it generates an ERP that is forward looking implied from
an equity market value that incorporates changes in the current market conditions. The
disadvantage is that it relies heavily on earnings and dividends estimates that are based on
accounting data, not updated frequently, and may not necessarily reflect the market cycles.
Easton (2007) gives a summary of possible limitations of such models.

For estimation procedure, the DDM of Damodaran (2015) is adopted. Damodaran developed a
two stages DDM where the dividend growth rate for the first five years is derived from the
analysts’ consensus estimates of growth in earnings for companies in the S&P 500 index. The
dividend growth rate in the sixth year and thereafter is assumed to be equal to the ten-year
nominal Treasury bond rate. The model is represented by the following equation

Pt =

Dt +1
Dt + 2
Dt +3
Dt + 4
Dt +5
Dt +6
+
+
+
+
+
2
3
4
5
(1 + R ) (1 + R)
(1 + R)
(1 + R)
(1 + R)
( R − G )(1 + R) 5

(6)

where Pt is the closing price of S&P 500 index at time t. Dt + i is the expected dividend at time
t+i. R is the expected return on the S&P 500 portfolio. G is the long term expected growth rate
for dividend, and it is assumed to be equal to the ten-year nominal Treasury bond rate starting
from year six. Note that for the first five years Dt + i grow at a rate equal to the analysts’
consensus estimates of growth in earnings for companies in the S&P 500 index.
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Using the IRR procedure and solving for R in equation (6) will yield an implied expected rate of
return. Subtracting the ten-year nominal Treasury bond rate from R will yield the implied ERP.

Free Cash Flow Model

The Free Cash Flow Model (FCFM) adopted in this work is also developed by Damodaran
(2015), and it is identical to his DDM except that expected free cash flow to equity (EFCFE) is
used as proxy for potential dividend. The expected free cash flows for investors are calculated by
adding stock buybacks to aggregate dividends paid. The model is represented by the following
equation

Pt =

EFCFE t +1 EFCFE t + 2 EFCFE t +3 EFCFE t + 4 EFCFE t +5
EFCFE t +6
+
+
+
+
+
2
3
4
5
(1 + R )
(1 + R )
(1 + R )
(1 + R )
(1 + R )
( R − G )(1 + R ) 5

(7)

where Pt is the closing price of S&P 500 index at time t. EFCFE t +i is the expected free cash
flow to equity at time t+i for the first five years. R is the expected return on the S&P 500
portfolio. G is the long term expected growth rate for potential dividend after year five, and it is
assumed to be equal to the ten-year nominal Treasury bond rate. The implied ERP is found by
solving for R and subtracting out the risk free rate. Table 3 gives a brief summary of the
variables and their sources for both the DDM and the FCFM. Table 4 provides the summary
statistics for the variables.
[Insert Table 3 here]
[Insert Table 4 here]
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Sharpe Ratio Model

The Sharpe Ratio Model (SRM) is inherited from the portfolio management theory and was first
defined by William F. Sharpe in his 1966 paper. The ratio measures the excess return of a risky
portfolio over the risk free rate per unit of risk. It is expressed as

Sp =

RP − R f

σp

(8)

where S p is the Sharpe ratio of a risky portfolio. RP is the expected return on a risky portfolio.

R f is the risk free rate, and σ p is the standard deviation of the risky portfolio. If we assume that
the Sharpe ratio is relatively stable over the long run, equation (8) can be rearranged to calculate
the implied ERP.

ERP = R P − R f = S p × σ p

(9)

Equation (9) states that the implied ERP for the S&P 500 portfolio index is the product of the
S&P 500 Sharpe ratio by a measure of its implied volatility. For estimation procedure, the VIX
index, calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), is adopted as a measure of
the implied volatility. The VIX index measures the volatility implied from options on the S&P
500 index over the next thirty calendar days. Mathematically it is an annualized standard
deviation equal to the square root of the risk-neutral expectation of the S&P 500 variance.
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Using annualized monthly values of the return on S&P 500 (RE), standard deviation of the S&P
500 (SD), and 3-Month Treasury Bill yield (TB), I estimate a Sharpe ratio ( S p ) of 0.38 over the
period 1929 to 2015. Using the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB10) instead of the
TB yield, I compute a Sharpe ratio of 0.34 over the period 1953 to 2015. The Sharpe ratio
estimates are consistent with the academic research estimates of 0.3 over the last fifty years.
Table 5 gives a summary of the estimate of the Sharpe Ratio value using different risk free rates.
[Insert Table 5 here]

Assuming a constant S p going forward, the implied ERP is equal to

ERP = S P × VIX

(10)

Using the SRM to estimate the implied ERP is not without limitations. Equation (10) depends on
two statistical measures that have their share of criticism. Bailey and López de Prado (2012)
made a valid argument when they demonstrated that the interpretation of the Sharpe ratio may be
misleading if the assumption of the normality of the returns is broken. Chow, Jiang, and Li
(2014) established that the VIX index tends to undervalue (overvalue) volatility when returns on
the S&P 500 are negatively (positively) skewed. Table 6 gives a brief summary of the variables
for the SRM. Table 7 provides the summary statistics for the variables.
[Insert Table 6 here]
[Insert Table 7 here]
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Results for the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model

Using the HMRRM, I calculated annual historical ERP as the excess RE over TB for the period
1928 to 2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over TB30 for the period 1977 to 2015,
over TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for the period 2010 to 2015
respectively. The graphs in Figure 2 depict the arithmetic and the geometric movement of the
historical ERP over the respective periods.
[Insert Figure 2 here]

It can be seen from the time series plots that the shorter the period the more volatile is the ERP.
In addition, the ERP tends to exhibit higher volatility at the beginning of the period but later
stabilizing towards the end. This pattern may indicate the existence of a mean-reversion process
in the data set over the long term. The graphs also indicate that the historical ERP estimates
using the arithmetic average are higher than the corresponding geometric average. Table 8 and 9
confirm these results. The arithmetic means for each time period, independently of the proxy
variable for the risk free rate, generates historical ERPs that are consistently higher than the
corresponding geometric means. The difference between the arithmetic means and the geometric
means varies from as high as 2.66 points (7.09% - 4.43%) for the historical ERP as the excess
RE over TB for the period 1928 to 2015, to as low as 0.29 points (8.72% – 8.43%) for the
historical ERP as the excess RE over TB30 for the period 2010 to 2015. The ‘Ibbotson’s

40
Answer’ research paper (n.d.) points out that the geometric average should be applied when
analyzing historical returns, while the arithmetic average should be adopted for forecasting.
[Insert Table 8 here]
[Insert Table 9 here]

The results from tables 8 and 9 also indicate that ERP varies considerably both across periods
and with the variable of choice for the risk free rate. For the estimates calculated as the excess
RE over TB, the ERP varies from as high as 12.71percent for the arithmetic mean for the period
2010 to 2015, to as low as 6.79percent for the period 1978 to 2015 and from 12.40percent for the
geometric mean for the period 2010 to 2015 to as low as 4.43percent for the period 1929 to 2015.
The choice of the appropriate length of time from which to estimate the ERP is not a settled
argument in the literature. Ibbotson Associates, one of the most widely used estimation service
for the ERP, uses data going back to 1926. Their argument is that since serial correlation for
annual ERP is close to zero, “the equity risk premium in one year cannot predict returns in the
next” (The ‘Ibbotson’s Answer’ research paper, n.d.); therefore, the appropriate length of time
from which to estimate the ERP is the longest period of quality reliable data available. Figure 3
graphs the annual historical ERP estimates as the excess RE over TB for the period 1928 to
2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over TB30 for the period 1977 to 2015, over
TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for the period 2010 to 2015 respectively.
Table 10 presents the results for the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for the
monthly ERP. The results of the LM test do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
Therefore, I conclude that the monthly historical ERP estimates are not serially correlated. This
conclusion holds regardless of which variable I choose to proxy for the risk free rate.
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[Insert Figure 3 here]
[Insert Table 10 here]

Many other analysts use much shorter periods, such as thirty, twenty or even ten years to
estimate the historical ERP. Their argument is that recent time periods offer more updated
estimates of the ERP because they incorporate recent changes in the perception of the risk
aversion among the average investor (Damodaran, 2015). Given the observed greater noise in the
ERP estimates with shorter time periods in tables 8 and 9, I proceed to calculate the standard
errors and the confidence intervals for the equity risk premium ERP in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11 here]

The results from table 11 indicate that even with the choice of the longest period of time from
1929 to 2015, the magnitude of the standard error 2.05 percent is significantly large with 95
percent confidence interval of [2.98% , 11.20%] for the arithmetic average and [0.32% , 8.54%]
for the geometric average for estimates of the ERP as the excess RE over the TB. Table 11 also
shows that even with 38 years of data, one cannot be confident that the equity premium is greater
than zero.

In terms of the variable of choice for the risk free rate, tables 8 and 9 show that the ERP
calculated as the excess RE over TB30 yield the lowest estimates for both the arithmetic and
geometric means and across all periods. The results also show that the ERP estimates vary
overtime depending on the length of the period, indicating that the historical ERP may be subject
to shifts in interest rates and macroeconomics variables.
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Results for the Dividend Discount Model and Free Cash Flow Model

As Damodaran (2015) stated; “the problem with any historical premium approach, even with
substantial modifications, is that it is backward looking.” The DDM allows us to calculate an
implied ERP that is forward looking. The model makes three important assumptions. First, it
assumes that markets are efficient and assets are correctly priced. Second, it uses potential
dividends instead of actual dividends to estimate the growth rate in dividends in the short term.
Precisely, Damodaran (2015) used the five years consensus estimate of growth in earnings for
the S&P 500 index to estimate the growth rate in dividends. Third, the model makes an
assumption about the long term growth of dividends by assuming that over the long term
dividends grow at rate equal to the long run growth rate in GDP or the yield on the ten years
Treasury bond. Damodaran (2015) assumes the latter. The FCFM makes the exact three
assumptions except that EFCFE is used as proxy for potential dividend. The EFCFE for investors
are calculated by adding stock buybacks to aggregate dividends paid.

Damodaran (2015) two stages DDM and FCFM estimates of the implied ERP are presented in
Table 12.
[Insert Table 12 here]

Figure 4 graphs the implied ERP for the two models.
[Insert Figure 4 here]

43
Figure 4 shows that the estimates for implied ERP using the FCFM are higher than the estimates
for the DDM. Damodaran (2015) explained that “the focus on dividends may be understating the
ERP, since the companies in the index have bought substantial amount of their own stocks” over
the period 1985 too 2015. Therefore, the FCFM is a better approach for estimating the implied
ERP since it accounts for a more comprehensive return to investors. The implied ERPs for the
DDM and the FCFM vary inversely with the economic growth. They increase at times of
recession and decrease at times of economic expansion. During the financial crisis of 2007, both
the implied ERP calculated using the DDM and the implied ERP calculated using the FCFM
increased by more than two percentage points. The implied ERP using the DDM increased from
2.06 percent at the end of 2007 to 4.05 percent at the peek of the crisis in 2008. The implied ERP
using the FCFM went from a value of 4.37 percent in 2007 to 6.43 percent in 2008.

Results for the Sharpe Ratio Model

The SRM implied ERP is the product of the S&P 500 Sharpe ratio by a measure of its implied
volatility. For estimation procedure, the VIX index, calculated by the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE), is adopted as a measure of the implied volatility. The Sharpe ratio calculated
using the TB yields a value of 0.38 over the period 1929 to 2015. The Sharpe ratios calculated
using the TB10 yields a value of 0.34 over the period 1953 to 2015. Table 13 gives the estimate
of the annual implied ERP using the SRM over the period 1990 to 2015.
[Insert Table 13 here]
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The estimates for the implied ERP using a Sharpe ratio of 0.38 and TB as a proxy for the risk
free rate yield estimates that are slightly higher by 0.79 points compared to the estimates of the
implied ERP using a Sharpe ratio of 0.34 and TB10 as a proxy for the risk free rate. The average
implied ERP calculated using TB rate for the period 1990 to 2015 is 7.54 percent. The average
implied ERP using the TB10 rate is 6.74 percent. As shown by figure 5, both implied ERPs
exhibit the same time series patterns over the period. The implied ERP tends to increase during
periods of economic contractions and decrease at times of economic growth. During the eight
months recession period from March 2001 to November 2001, caused by the collapse of the
speculative dot-com bubble and the September 11th attacks, the implied ERP increased by
almost one and half percentage point from its pre-recession value of 8.88 percent to its postrecession value of 10.34 percent. During the subprime mortgage crisis from December 2007 to
June 2009, the implied ERP increased even more dramatically by more than five percentage
points from a value of 6.63 percent at the end of 2007 to 12.41 percent at the end of 2009. The
increase in the implied ERP is a testimony of the severe volatility of the stock market and the
fear that engulfed the minds of investors during the crisis.
[Insert Figure 5 here]

Comparison of the ERP Estimates across the Four Models over the Last Two Decades

Figure 6 plots the time series for the historical geometric ERP using the TB rate, the implied
ERP based on the DDM, the implied ERP based on the FCFM, and the implied ERP based on the
SRM for the periods 1990 to 2015. Implied ERP estimates for the DDM and FCFM are lower
than the historical ERP for most of the period. Damodaran (2015) attributes this to the
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survivorship bias of the United States stock market that causes the implied ERP to be generally
lower than the historical ERP. For the period beginning with the subprime mortgage crisis in late
2007, the implied ERP for the FCFM are only slightly lower or even higher than the historical
ERP estimates. In table 14 I test for the equality of the mean for the implied ERP using FCFM
and the historical Geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015. The results do not
reject the null hypothesis that the Mean of the implied ERP for the FCFM is equal to the Mean of
the historical geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015. Damodaran (2015)
explained this by the decrease in the interest rates during recession periods, the large drop in the
S&P 500 index value, and the changes in investors risk aversion.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
[Insert Table 14 here]

Figure 6 also shows that the implied ERP estimates from the SRM tend to overshoot the
historical ERP estimates during times of increased volatility and revert back to the historical ERP
levels at times of low volatility. This is evident with the dot-com bubble and the September 11th
attacks during the period of March 2001 to November 2001, and more recently with the
subprime mortgage crisis and the financial crisis that followed during the period of December
2007 to June 2009. During these two recession periods the VIX index increased by 10.98 percent
and 87.10 percent respectively. The VIX index also increased substantially during the period of
strong bull market from 1995 to 2000. Particularly, the VIX index increased more than 30percent
in 1996 and 1997. The relationship between the implied ERP and the VIX index is well
documented in the literature. Harvey and Graham (2012) documented a positive relationship
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between the implied volatility and the implied ERP. The authors explained that an increase in
volatility is perceived as an increase in probabilities of losses by investors.

COCLUSIO

In this chapter I tested and contrasted the results of four different models for estimating the ERP.
Results from the HMRRM, the DDM, the FCFM, and the SRM indicate the following:

•

The estimates of the ERP, both historical and implied, vary considerably depending on
(a) the variable of choice for the risk free rate; (b) the selection and the length of the
estimation period; (c) and the estimation method.

•

The DDM and the FCFM produce estimates for the implied ERP that are below the
historical estimates, while the SRM produces implied ERP values that are usually higher
than the historical values of the ERP.

•

The post 2008 financial crisis period produces estimates for the historical ERP that are
slightly higher or lower than the implied ERP estimates for the FCFM. This result
suggests that the subprime mortgage crisis may have resulted in market self-correction
and in investor re-evaluation of the risk aversion level.

•

The implied ERP estimates for the three models are more volatile than the historical ERP.
In particular, estimates of the implied ERP from the SRM tend to overshoot the historical
ERP estimates during periods of high volatility and fall below the historical level during
periods of low stock market volatility.

•

The choice between historical ERP estimates and implied ERP estimates is a question of
belief. Models for the implied ERP assume that markets are efficient and securities are
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correctly priced. Therefore if one believes in market efficiency then implied ERP is the
best option for predicting future returns. On the other hand, if one is skeptical about the
efficiency assumption and believes in market timing then the historical ERP is a better
option.

Variable
S&P 500 Composite Price Index
3-Month Treasury Bill
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
10-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security, Constant Maturity
30-Year Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security, Constant Maturity

Notes
Close prices adjusted for splits and dividends
Secondary market average percentage rates, not seasonally adjusted
Period average percentage rate, not seasonally adjusted
Period average percentage rate, not seasonally adjusted*
Period average percentage rate, not seasonally adjusted
Period average percentage rate, not seasonally adjusted

Frequency
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly

Period
01/1929 - 09/2015
01/1929 - 09/2015
01/1954 - 09/2015
01/1978 - 09/2015
01/2003 - 09/2015
01/2010 - 09/2015

Link
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC+Historical+Prices
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TB3MS/
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GS10/
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GS30/
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FII10/
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FII30/

Source
Yahoo Finance data base
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

* The Treasury department stopped issuing the 30-year Treasury constant maturity series on February 18, 2002, and reintroduced it on
February 9, 2006. During that period the Treasury department published daily linear extrapolation factors that could be added to the
Long-Term Average Rate to allow interested parties to compute an estimated 30-year rate.

Symbol
SP
TB
TB10
TB30
TBI10
TBI30

Table 1. (Continued)

Symbol
SP
TB
TB10
TB30
TBI10
TBI30

This table lists the variables used for estimating the equity risk premium using the historical mean realized return model: S&P 500
composite price index (SP), 3-month treasury bill yield (TB), 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10), 30-year treasury
constant maturity rate (TB30), 10-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-year treasury
inflation-indexed security constant maturity rate (TBI30).

Table 1. List of Variables for the Historical Mean Realized Return Model
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Variable
RE
TB
TB10
TB30
TBI10
TBI30

Period
01/1929 - 09/2015
01/1929 - 09/2015
01/1954 - 09/2015
01/1978 - 09/2015
01/2003 - 09/2015
01/2010 - 09/2015

Obs.
1041
1041
741
453
153
68

Mean
0.8376%
0.2819%
0.4872%
0.5603%
0.1021%
0.0962%

Minimum
-26.2033%
0.0008%
0.1266%
0.2023%
-0.0644%
0.0275%

Maximum
51.1583%
1.2666%
1.1949%
1.1483%
0.2377%
0.1782%

Std. Dev.
4.5500%
0.2498%
0.2189%
0.2211%
0.0777%
0.0425%

Skewness
0.6688
0.9639
0.8263
0.6135
-0.5018
0.2415

Ex. Kurtosis
18.7592
0.8658
0.3973
-0.3403
-0.8108
-1.0228

This table provides the summary statistics of the variables used for estimating the equity risk premium using the historical mean
realized return model: S&P 500 index return (RE), 3-month treasury bill yield (TB), 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10),
30-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB30), 10-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity rate (TBI30). All observations are monthly.

Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables for the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model
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Variable
S&P 500 Composite Price Index
Dividend Yield
Earnings Yield
10-Years Nominal Treasury Bond Rate
Damodaran (2015)

Source

Frequency
Yearly
Yearly
Yearly
Yearly

Period
1978 - 2014
1978 - 2014
1978 - 2014
1978 - 2014

http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

Link

Variable
RE
DY
EY
TB10

Obs.

37
37
37
37

Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Ex. Kurtosis
13.0453%
-36.5523%
37.1952%
16.3490%
-0.9454
1.1531
2.8363%
1.1374%
5.5700%
1.3230%
0.7038
-0.6627
6.6061%
3.0741%
13.4800%
2.5729%
1.1311
0.8444
6.4708%
1.7600%
13.9800%
3.1552%
0.5436
-0.4055

This table provides the summary statistics of the following variables used for estimating the implied equity risk premium using the
DDM and the FCFM developed by Damodaran (2015): S&P 500 index return (RE), dividend yield (DY), earnings yield (EY), and the
10-year nominal treasury bond rate (TB10). The sample period is yearly from 1978 to 2014.

Table 4. Summary Statistics of Variables for the Dividend Discount Model and the Free Cash Flow Model of Damodaran
(2015)

Symbol
SP
DY
EY
TB10

This table lists the variables used for estimating the implied equity risk premium using the DDM and the FCFM developed by
Damodaran (2015): S&P 500 composite price index (SP), dividend yield (DY), earnings yield (EY), and the 10-year nominal treasury
bond rate at the end of the year (TB10).

Table 3. List of Variables for the Dividend Discount Model and the Free Cash Flow Model of Damodaran (2015)
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Table 5. Summary of the Sharpe Ratio Estimates
This table provides the summary estimate of the Sharpe Ratio value using the risk free rates 3month Treasury bill yield (TB), and 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10) over the
periods 1929 to 2015 and 1953 to 2015 respectively.
Estimates of the Sharpe Ratio
Using TB

Using TB10

1929-2015

1953-2015

Average Annual ERP

7.53%

5.91%

Annual Stand. Dev. ERP

19.62%

17.37%

Sharpe Ratio*

0.3839

0.3400

Period

* Sharpe Ratio = Average Annual ERP / Stand. Dev. ERP

Notes
Close prices adjusted for splits and dividends
Secondary market average percentage rates
Period average percentage rate
Average daily value for each month

Name
SP
TB
TB10
VIX

Frequency
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Daily

Period
01/1990 - 09/2015
01/1990 - 09/2015
01/1990 - 09/2015
01/2/1990 - 09/30/2015

http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EVIX&a=00&b=2&c=1990&d=10&e=19&f=2015&g=m

https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GS10/

https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TB3MS/

http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC+Historical+Prices

Link

Source
Yahoo Finance data base
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Yahoo Finance data base

Variable
S&P 500 Composite Price Index
3-Month Treasury Bill
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
VIX Index

Name
SP
TB
TB10
VIX

This table lists the variables used for estimating the implied equity risk premium using the SRM: S&P 500 composite price index (SP),
the 3-Month Treasury Bill yield (TB), the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB10), and the VIX index.

Table 6. List of Variables for the Sharpe Ratio Model
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Variable
RE
TB
TB10
VIX

Obs.
309
309
309
309

Mean
0.7958%
0.2403%
0.3962%
19.8617

Minimum
-20.2040%
0.0011%
0.1266%
10.8176

Maximum
12.2924%
0.6355%
0.7123%
62.6395

Std. Dev.
3.5569%
0.1851%
0.1460%
7.6722

Skewness
-0.9702
0.0445
0.0990
1.9669

Ex. Kurtosis
4.7429
-1.3054
-0.7875
6.4109

This table provides the summary statistics of the following variables used for estimating the implied equity risk premium using the
SRP: the return on S&P 500 index (RE), the 3-Month Treasury Bill yield (TB), the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (TB10),
and the VIX index for the period 1990:M1 to 2015:M9.

Table 7. Summary Statistics of Variables for the Sharpe Ratio Model
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Table 8. Geometric Mean Estimates of the ERP for the HMRRM
This table presents the annualized geometric mean estimates of the equity risk premium (ERP)
using the historical mean realized return model (HMRRM). The risk free rates used for the
estimates are 3-month treasury bill yield (TB), 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10),
30-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB30), 10-year treasury inflation-indexed security
constant maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity
rate (TBI30). The return on equity (RE) is the S&P 500 index return. All variables are monthly
and the sample period varies with the variable of choice for the risk free rate.
Annualized Geometric Mean Historical ERP
Period

RE-TB

RE-TB10

RE-TB30

RE-TBI10

RE-TBI30

1929-2015
1953-2015
1978-2015
2003-2015
2010-2015

4.43%
8.65%
6.07%
7.97%
12.40%

7.34%
4.61%
5.78%
9.54%

4.50%
5.08%
8.43%

8.07%
11.87%

11.03%
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Table 9. Arithmetic Mean Estimates of the ERP for the HMRRM
This table presents the annual Arithmetic mean estimates of the equity risk premium (ERP) using
the historical mean realized return model (HMRRM). The risk free rates used for the estimates
are 3-month treasury bill yield (TB), 10-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB10), 30-year
treasury constant maturity rate (TB30), 10-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant
maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity rate
(TBI30). The return on equity (RE) is the S&P 500 index return. All variables are monthly and
the sample period varies with the variable of choice for the risk free rate.

Period
1929-2015
1953-2015
1978-2015
2003-2015
2010-2015

RE-TB
7.09%
10.20%
6.79%
9.39%
12.71%

Annualized Arithmetic Mean Historical ERP
RE-TB10
RE-TB30
RE-TBI10
8.84%
5.32%
7.16%
9.83%

5.22%
6.44%
8.72%

9.47%
12.17%

RE-TBI30

11.33%
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Table 10. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for the annual ERP
This table presents the results for the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for the
monthly ERP. The null hypothesis; there is no serial correlation. The alternative hypothesis;
there is serial correlation. Decision; reject the null hypothesis if the probability of Chi-Square is
less than 5%.
The results of the LM test do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for all ERPs.
The monthly historical ERP estimates are not serially correlated.
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TB
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared

10.09366
1.031929

Durbin-Watson stat

2.002125

Prob. F(1,1050)
Prob. Chi-Square(1)

0.0015
0.3097

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TB10
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared

1.753516
0.000000

Durbin-Watson stat

2.000461

Prob. F(2,746)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.1739
1.0000

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TB30
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared

1.252137
0.000000

Durbin-Watson stat

2.000522

Prob. F(2,460)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.2869
1.0000

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TBI10
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared

2.266588
2.147223

Durbin-Watson stat

2.012565

Prob. F(2,149)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.1072
0.3418

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for Monthly ERP = RE-TBI30
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared

2.118944
0.000000

Durbin-Watson stat

1.989860

Prob. F(2,64)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.1285
1.0000

Standard Error of ERP for the HMRRM
Std.
Arith.
Error
Average
95% Conf. Interval
2.05%
7.09%
[2.98% , 11.20%]
2.09%
8.84%
[4.65% , 13.03%]
2.43%
5.22%
[0.37% , 10.07%]
4.89%
9.47%
[-0.30% , 19.24%]
4.80%
11.33%
[1.74% , 20.92%]

Obs.
**The 95% confidence interval is [ERP − (2 × Std .Error ), ERP + (2 × Std .Error )]

Std .Dev.

Period
1929-2015
1953-2015
1978-2015
2003-2015
2010-2015

*The standard error is

ERP
RE-TB
RE-TB10
RE-TB30
RE-TBI10
RE-TBI30

Std.
Obs. Dev.
87 19.15%
63 16.62%
38 14.95%
13 17.62%
6
11.75%

Geom.
Average
4.43%
7.34%
4.50%
8.07%
11.03%

95% Conf. Interval
[0.32% , 8.54%]
[3.15% , 11.53%]
[-0.35% , 9.35%]
[-1.70% , 17.84%]
[1.44% , 20.62%]

This table presents the annualized standard error and confidence interval for the equity risk premium (ERP) using the historical mean
realized return model (HMRRM). The risk free rates used for the estimates are 3-month treasury bill yield (TB), 10-year treasury
constant maturity rate (TB10), 30-year treasury constant maturity rate (TB30), 10-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant
maturity rate (TBI10), and 30-year treasury inflation-indexed security constant maturity rate (TBI30). The return on equity (RE) is the
S&P 500 index return.

Table 11. Standard Error of ERP for the HMRRM
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Table 12. ERP based on Damodaran (2015) Two Stages DDM and FCFM Estimates of the
Implied ERP
This table presents the annual implied ERP based on Damodaran (2015) two stages dividends
discount model (DDM) and free cash flows model (FCFM) for the periods 1961 to 2015 and
1985 to 2015 respectively.
Implied ERP
Year

DDM

FCFE

Year

DDM

FCFE

1961

2.92%

-

1989

3.85%

3.51%

1962

3.56%

-

1990

3.92%

3.89%

1963

3.38%

-

1991

3.27%

3.48%

1964

3.31%

-

1992

2.83%

3.55%

1965

3.32%

-

1993

2.74%

3.17%

1966

3.68%

-

1994

3.06%

3.55%

1967

3.20%

-

1995

2.44%

3.29%

1968

3.00%

-

1996

2.11%

3.20%

1969

3.74%

-

1997

1.67%

2.73%

1970

3.41%

-

1998

1.38%

2.26%

1971

3.09%

-

1999

1.20%

2.05%

1972

2.72%

-

2000

1.65%

2.87%

1973

4.30%

-

2001

1.73%

3.62%

1974

5.59%

-

2002

2.29%

4.10%

1975

4.13%

-

2003

2.12%

3.69%

1976

4.55%

-

2004

2.02%

3.65%

1977

5.92%

-

2005

2.20%

4.08%

1978

5.72%

-

2006

1.97%

4.16%

1979

6.45%

-

2007

2.06%

4.37%

1980

5.03%

-

2008

4.05%

6.43%

1981

5.73%

-

2009

2.60%

4.36%

1982

4.90%

-

2010

2.24%

5.20%

1983

4.31%

-

2011

2.71%

6.01%

1984

5.11%

-

2012

2.47%

5.78%

1985

4.03%

3.84%

2013

2.03%

4.96%

1986

3.36%

3.58%

2014

2.24%

5.78%

1987

4.18%

3.99%

2015

2.46%

6.12%

1988

4.12%

3.77%

Avg.

3.31%

4.03%
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Table 13. Estimate of the Annual Implied ERP using the Sharpe Ratio Model
This table provides the estimate of the annual implied ERP over the period 1990 to 2015 using
Sharpe ratios values of 0.38 (calculated using TB rate) and 0.34 (calculated using TB10). The
implied ERP is the product of the VIX index by the value of the Sharpe ratio.
Implied ERP for the Sharpe Ratio Model

Year

VIX Index

Using TB and Sharpe
Ratio of 0.38
Annual ERP

Using TB10 and
Sharpe Ratio of 0.34
Annual ERP

1990

23.0455

8.76%

7.84%

1991

18.4002

6.99%

6.26%

1992

15.4581

5.87%

5.26%

1993

12.6986

4.83%

4.32%

1994

13.9457

5.30%

4.74%

1995

12.3717

4.70%

4.21%

1996

16.4452

6.25%

5.59%

1997

22.4310

8.52%

7.63%

1998

25.5519

9.71%

8.69%

1999

24.4491

9.29%

8.31%

2000

23.3646

8.88%

7.94%

2001

25.9301

9.85%

8.82%

2002

27.2034

10.34%

9.25%

2003

22.0908

8.39%

7.51%

2004

15.4855

5.88%

5.27%

2005

12.7952

4.86%

4.35%

2006

12.7810

4.86%

4.35%

2007

17.4515

6.63%

5.93%

2008

32.6525

12.41%

11.10%

2009

31.6612

12.03%

10.77%

2010

22.5909

8.58%

7.68%

2011

24.0316

9.13%

8.17%

2012

17.7959

6.76%

6.05%

2013

14.2296

5.41%

4.84%

2014

14.1463

5.38%

4.81%

2015

16.5741

6.30%

5.64%

Avg.

19.8300

7.54%

6.74%
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Table 14. Test for the Equality of the Mean for the Implied ERP using FCFM and the
Historical Geometric ERP using TB Rate
This table provides Test for the equality of the mean for the implied ERP using FCFM and the
historical Geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015.

Test for the Equality of the Mean for the implied ERP using
FCFM and the historical Geo ERP using TB
Date: 04/04/16 Time: 03:15
Hypothesis Testing
H0: Mean of implied ERP FCFM - Mean historical Geo ERP TB = 0
H1: Mean of implied ERP FCFM - Mean historical Geo ERP TB is different
than 0
Result: Reject H0 if probability <0.05
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2015
Included observations: 9 after adjustments
Sample Mean = 0.001654
Sample Std. Dev. = 0.008715
Probability
Method
Value
t-statistic
0.569423
0.5847*

* I do not reject the null hypothesis that the Mean of the implied ERP for the FCFM is equal to
the Mean of the historical geometric ERP using TB rate over the period 2007 to 2015.
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Figure 2. Mean ERP Based on the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model
This figure plots the time series for the arithmetic and geometric annual ERP calculated as the
excess RE over TB for the period 1928 to 2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over
TB30 for the period 1977 to 2015, over TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for
the period 2010 to 2015 respectively.
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Figure 2. Continued
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Figure 3. Annual ERP Based on the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model
This figure plots the time series for annual ERP calculated as the excess RE over TB for the
period 1928 to 2015, over TB10 for the period 1953 to 2015, over TB30 for the period 1978 to
2015, over TBI10 for the period 2003 to 2015, and over TBI30 for the period 2010 to 2015
respectively.
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Figure 3. Continued
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Figure 4. Annual Implied ERP Estimates Based on Damodaran (2015) Two Stages DDM
and FCFM
This figure plots the time series for annual implied ERP based on Damodaran (2015) two stages
DDM and FCFM for the periods 1961 to 2015 and 1985 to 2015 respectively.
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Figure 5. Annual Implied ERP Estimates for the Sharpe Ratio Model
This figure plots the time series for annual implied ERP based on the Sharpe Ratio Model for the
periods 1990 to 2015.
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Figure 6. Comparison of the ERP Estimates across the Four Models
This figure plots the time series for the historical geometric ERP using the TB rate, the implied
ERP based on the DDM, the implied ERP based on the FCFM, and the implied ERP based on the
SRM for the periods 1990 to 2015.
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CHAPTER III
MACROECOOMIC VARIABLES AD THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

DISCUSSIO AD RELATED LITERATURE

Historically, the magnitude of the equity risk premium has undergone significant changes.
Campbell (2007) summarized this fact by stating that:

“The equity premium is not a constant number that can be estimated ever more precisely, but an
unknown state variable whose value must be inferred at each point in time on the basis of
observable data.”

It is apparent from the data that the value of equity risk premium has undergone a significant
increase in the 20th century compared to the 19th century. What is not clear though is when the
shift took place exactly. Fama and French (2002) suggested that the year 1950 represents the
break point between periods of relatively low and high equity risk premium. They computed an
equity risk premium of 4.4 percent for the period 1872 – 1950 and 7.43 percent for the period
1951 – 2000. The authors argued that a reduction in the dividend-price ratio associated with a
significant capital gain may be behind the significant increase in the magnitude of the equity risk
premium in the U.S. since 1950. Others, such as Kyriacou et al. (2006), argued that the historical
upward shift in the magnitude of the equity risk premium happened around World War One
(more precisely in the year 1914) with inflation (specifically unanticipated inflation) as a
triggering mechanism.
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Unexpected Inflation and the Equity Risk Premium

Variation in the Equity Premium with Respect to Macroeconomic Variables

The substantial variation of the equity risk premium over the past two centuries is an indication
that it may be subject to underlying macroeconomic forces. Barro (2006) argued that during
wartime the perceived increase in the probability of future economic disaster led to a decrease in
the real interest rates and an increase in actual and expected level of inflation rates. He observed
that the expected U.S. real interest rates fell during the Civil War, World War I, World War II,
and more recently during 2001 – 2005 period of September 11 attacks and the conflict in
Afghanistan and Iraq where the ten-year real rate fell from 3.8 percent to 1.6 percent. Moreover
and according to Barro, bonds tend to outperform stocks during periods of economic disaster
which leads to an increase in the magnitude of the equity risk premium.

Lettau et al. (2007) found a strong correlation between low frequency movements in
macroeconomic volatility and low frequency movements in the stock market. In particular, they
noticed that the sharp increase in the stock market during 1990s coincided with a move toward
lower macroeconomic risk that led to a fall in expected future stock returns and a lower equity
risk premium after 1990. Their model predicted that the magnitude of the equity risk premium
plummets as the economy gears toward a state of low macroeconomic volatility.

Smith et al. (2008) tested three leading general models of equity premium namely; the
consumption-CAPM with power utility model, the Epstein and Zin General Equilibrium model
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with time non-separable preferences and the habit-persistence model. The authors found that the
magnitude of the equity risk premium tends to increase sharply in economic periods
characterized with negative excess returns and that a two factors model with consumption and
inflation as main variables tend to be the best models that can explain the observed equity risk
premium both for the U.S. and U.K.

Variation in the Equity Premium with Respect to Inflation

Copeland (1982) argued that in the presence of uncertain inflation, firms may recourse to prices
increase in order to attenuate the effect of uncertain inflation. Whereas, bondholders do not have
recourse to such an option and as such they face a higher risk of capital loss compared to
stockholders in the presence of uncertain inflation. In addition, the presence of uncertain
inflation makes bonds less attractive under the call-back provision. By consequence, the equity
risk premium should be smaller in magnitude during periods of uncertain inflation. The author’s
empirical analysis yielded an equity risk premium of 3.2 percent during the period 1926-1978
after accounting for uncertain inflation, compared to Ibbotson and Sinquefield’s (1979) equity
risk premium of 5 percent during the same period. In addition, the author estimated an equity risk
premium of negative 0.81 percent for the year 1980, which runs against the conventional wisdom
at that time of a positive equity risk premium and higher return for stocks than for bonds.

Kyriacou et al. (2006) echoed the findings of Copeland (1982) by stating that the equity risk
premium has been significantly positively related to the rate of inflation over the period 1871 –
2002. In addition, the relative poor performance of bonds during inflationary periods has resulted
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in a much higher equity risk premium in the post 1914 period than before. Numerically, had the
inflation rate been zero for the period 1914 – 2002, the equity risk premium for the period would
have been 4.61 percent and not 7.34 percent.

Moerman and Van Dijk (2010) relaxed the assumption that inflation rates are constant and
tested the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) for the G5 countries ( France,
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US) over the period 1975 – 1998 and found that inflation risk is
statistically and significantly priced in assets’ return.

Schmeling and Schrimpf (2011) empirically showed that expected inflation rates are significant
and strong predictors of future stock returns in several industrialized countries (Germany, United
Kingdom, United States, France, Italy, and Japan). In particular, a one standard deviation
increase in the expected rate of inflation decreases the stock returns by more than six percent
over the following six months period which will lead to a higher equity risk premium over the
same period. This negative relationship between inflation and stock returns may be triggered by
a monetary policy transmission channel that starts by lowering the level of interest rate in order
to boost output, raise investment activities and by consequence increase stock valuations.
However, if the monetary policy is also seen as raising the inflation expectations, stock prices
fall, the cost of capital increases and the equity premium increases.
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Relationship between Stock Returns and Inflation

on egative Relationship between Stock Returns and Inflation

The paradigm that stock returns are positively correlated with inflation rate emanates from the
original work of Fisher (1930) who stated that the expected rates of return on common stocks is
the sum of the real return on common stocks plus the expected rate of inflation, also known as
the Fisher Equation.

Firth (1979) examined the relationship between rates of return on common stocks and inflation in
the U.K. for the period 1935 – 1976 and found evidence for the support of the Fisher Equation.
In other words, nominal common stock returns in the U.K. tended to be positively correlated
with the inflation rate.

Benderly and Zwick (1985) provided evidence that in the long run the relationship between real
common stock returns and inflation is fully consistent with market efficiency and that the rate of
return on equity is invariant to changes in nominal variables such as inflation. Nevertheless, the
authors conceded that a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation may exist in the
short run during periods of disequilibrium where the inflation rate did not fully adjust to the
growth in money supply.

Titman and Warga (1989) documented a statistically significant positive relationship between
stock returns and inflation for the period 1979 – 1982 in the U.S. Nevertheless, the authors
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remained puzzled why the positive relationship holds mainly in the above period. One advanced
explanation is that the interest rate and the inflation rate were by some means more predictable
during this period and by consequence more rapidly integrated into stock returns.

Mishkin (1992) reexamined the view that there was a strong Fisher effect in the U.S. during the
post World War II before 1979 period and concluded that a strong Fisher effect occurs only
during certain periods, mainly in the long run and when both inflation and interest rates exhibit
common stochastic trend. The author found no support for the Fisher effect in the short term,
implying a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation in the short run.

Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) accumulated two centuries of data on stocks, short-term and
long-term bonds, and inflation in both the U.S. and the U.K from 1802 to 1990 and found
evidence to suggest that nominal stock returns are positively correlated with both ex-ante and expost inflation over the long-term horizon in both countries.

Du (2006) postulated that the relationship between stock returns and inflation depended both on
the monetary policy regime and the relative importance of the demand and supply shocks to the
economy. Empirically, the author found that over the entire period of 1926 – 2001, only the subperiod 1926 – 1939 exhibited signs of a positive relationship between stock returns and inflation
that was due mainly to strongly pro-cyclical monetary policy. For rest of the period from 1940 to
2001, the results strongly support a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation that
the author attributed mainly to supply shocks.
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Alagidede (2009) tested the relationship between stock returns and inflation in six African
economies (Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia) and concluded that
stocks acted as a good hedge against inflation (positive relationship) over the long horizon in at
least three markets (Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia).

egative Relationship between Stock Returns and Inflation

The negative relationship between stock return and inflation is well documented in finance
literature. Bodie (1976) attempted to address the question of how effective common stocks are in
hedging against inflation. The author asserted that the answer to his question depends on two
parameters. The first is the ratio of the variance of the non-inflation stochastic component of the
real return on common stocks to the variance of unanticipated inflation. The larger this variance
ratio is the less effective common stocks are in hedging against inflation. The second is the
difference between the nominal return on the riskless asset and the coefficient of the
unanticipated inflation. The greater the absolute value of this difference the more effective
common stocks are in hedging against inflation. Estimates of the annual, quarterly, and monthly
data for the period 1953 – 1972 revealed that the real return on equity is negatively related to
both anticipated and unanticipated inflation. The author concluded that a sell short strategy is the
only way for common stocks to effectively hedge against inflation.

Jaffe and Mandelker (1976) examined the relationship between the returns on common stocks
and the inflation during the period 1953 – 1971 and found significant negative relationship
between monthly returns on common stocks and both anticipated and unanticipated inflation.
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However, when yearly returns on common stocks were used for the period 1875 - 1970, the
negative relationship disappeared, suggesting that the negative relationship between returns on
common stock and inflation is one of a short horizon.

Fama and Schwert (1977) tested the effectiveness of various types of assets in hedging again
anticipated and unanticipated inflation during the period 1953 – 1971. Their findings indicated
that only private residential real estate was an effective hedge instrument against both anticipated
and unanticipated inflation. Government bonds and bills were only effective in hedging against
anticipated inflation. Labor income appeared to have no relationship with both anticipated and
unanticipated inflation at least in the short term. While, common stocks failed to act as a hedge
instrument and showed negative relationship with respect to both anticipated and unanticipated
inflation. Nonetheless, the authors were keen to note that the negative relationship between
common stocks and inflation accounted only for a small portion of the returns variation and did
not represent a reason for profitable trading opportunity.

Nelson (1979) used quarterly data for the period 1954 – 1970 and found that U.S. price level is
very slow to respond to changes in nominal income and that inflation is deflationary, a result that
the author found to be consistent with a negative relationship between the stock returns and
inflation rates in the U.S.

Solnik (1983) extended the analysis further by testing the relationship between stock returns and
inflation in nine countries (U.S., Japan, U.K., Switzerland, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Belgium, and Canada) over the period 1971 – 1980. The results suggested a rejection of the
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assumption that real returns are independent of inflationary expectations. Instead the author
found consistent support that stock returns tend to move downwards in the presence of
inflationary expectations. This indicated that the negative relationship between stock returns and
inflation is evident not only in the U.S. but also in major industrial countries.

Gultekin (1983) examined the relationship between common stock returns and inflation in
twenty-six countries using monthly data for the period 1947 – 1979 and found evidence for the
rejection of the Fisher hypothesis that real returns are independent of expected inflation and that
nominal returns move on one-to-one basis with regard to expected inflation. Instead, the results
indicated that the relationship between common stock returns and expected inflation is
predominantly negative across the twenty-six countries.

Wahlroos and Berglund (1986) used data from the Finnish economy to test the Fisher hypothesis
that real stock returns are independent of inflation rate. Their results showed a significant
negative relationship between stock returns and both expected as well as unexpected inflation
and whether they controlled for real activity or not in their testing model.

Laopodis (2006) looked at the relationship between real stock returns and inflation under three
monetary policy regimes (Arthur Burns from 1970 to 1978, Paul Volcker from 1979 to 1987, and
Alan Greenspan from 1988 to 2005) using bivariate and multivariate vector autoregressive
cointegration specifications. The results indicated that the bivariate model supported a weak
negative relationship in the 1970s and 1980s, while the multivariate model carried a strong
negative relationship between real stock returns and inflation in the 1970s.
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Explaining the egative Relationship between Stock Return and Inflation

Many theories have been advanced to explain the negative relationship between stock return and
inflation. For the purpose of this work I am going to focus on two of the more plausible theories:
The Proxy Hypothesis of Fama (1981), and the Risk Premium Hypothesis of Tobin (1958).

The proxy hypothesis

The Proxy Hypothesis theory was first introduced by Fama in his 1981 paper. The basic
argument of the Proxy Hypothesis theory is that stock returns are not only forecasted using real
economic variables such as the annual growth rates of industrial production, change in the capital
expenditures ratio, and change in the real rate of return on capital, but also exhibit positive
relationships with these variables. Expected inflation is however negatively related to such
expected real economic variables. By consequence, the negative relationship between stock
return and expected inflation is a proxy for the positive relationship between stock return and
future real economic variables.

Using monthly, quarterly, and annual data for the post-1953 period, Fama provided numerical
evidences for the Proxy Hypothesis theory. In particular, the annual results indicated that the
negative relationship between real stock returns and inflation rates disappears when growth rates
of money and real activity variables are included in the forecasting equation. Nonetheless, the
monthly and the quarterly empirical results suggested the presence of a negative explanatory
power for unexpected inflation over the short term horizon. The author attributed this negative
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relationship between inflation and expected real return to the unexpected characteristics of the
money supply during the post-1953 period.

Kaul (1987) analyzed data from four industrialized countries (U.S., Canada, U.K., and Germany)
to conclude that the relationship between stock returns and inflation varies over time depending
on the equilibrium process in the monetary sector. In particular, this relationship tends to be
negative during times of counter-cyclical movements in money, prices, and stock returns and
positive during times of pro-cyclical movements monetary responses.

Lee (1992) used a multivariate vector-autoregression (VAR) to explore the causal relationship
between real stock returns, real interest rates, real activities (growth industrial production), and
rate of inflation during U.S. postwar period of January 1947 to December 1987. He found that
stock returns explained a very small portion of the variation in inflation in the presence of real
interest rates in the VAR equation. In addition, inflation was responsible for a small variation in
real activities with the latter responding negatively to shocks in inflation. These results lead the
author to conclude no causal linkage existed between the real stock returns and money supply
growth and between real stock returns and inflation rates.

Gallagher and Taylor (2002) developed a theoretical model to test Fama’s Proxy Hypothesis
theory using a multivariate innovation decomposition technique over the period 1957 through
1997. The contribution of the authors is in isolating the demand innovations that are assumed to
be associated with temporary shocks to real economic variables from the supply innovations that
are assumed to be associated with permanent shocks to real economic variables. Under these
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assumptions, real stock returns were found to be insignificantly correlated with inflation in the
presence of demand shocks, but strongly significantly negatively correlated with inflation in the
presence of supply shocks as predicted by the Proxy Hypothesis Theory.

Gregoriou and Kontonikas (2010) used data from sixteen OECD countries over the sample
period 1970–2006 to examine the long-run relationship between stock prices and goods’ prices
and to test whether stocks’ market investment can provide a hedge against inflation. The
empirical analysis advocated a positive long-run relationship between goods’ prices and stock
prices and suggested that stocks hedge against inflation in the long run as predicted by the Fisher
hypothesis.

The Risk Premium Hypothesis

The Risk Premium Hypothesis has its roots in Tobin’s (1958) paper in which he argued that
money demand depends, among other things, on the risk aversion of economic agents and on the
perceived risk of competing assets. In particular, uncertainty about monetary policy increases
inflation risk. And an unexpected increase in inflation causes the market risk premium to rise,
resulting in an increase in the required rate of return on stocks. The increase in the required rate
of return causes stock prices to fall.

Cornell (1983) studied the reaction of asset prices to money supply announcements by testing
four of the major theories (the Risk Premium Hypothesis, the Expected Inflation Hypothesis, the
Keynesian Hypothesis, and the Real Activities Hypothesis) that explained why money supply
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announcements alter asset prices. Results of his tests indicated that money supply
announcements have an impact on the real rate. However, the author did not go as far as stating
that monetary shocks affect the real rate, because the change in real rate could be also explained
by changes in real economic variables as a result of the announcements about the money supply.

Wahlroos and Berglund (1986) used data from the Finnish economy first to test the Generalized
Fisher Hypothesis that stock returns are independent of inflationary expectations and second to
test whether Fama Proxy Hypothesis accounts for the negative relationship between stock returns
and unexpected inflation in case of the rejection of the Fisher Hypothesis. The outcome was a
rejection of the Fisher Hypothesis with a highly significant negative relationship between stock
returns and expected inflation as well as stock returns and unexpected inflation. In addition, the
negative relationship persisted even with the inclusion of measures of real activity into the
equation. This led the author to conclude that the Proxy Hypothesis is unable to explain the
strong negative relationship between stock returns and expected and unexpected inflation.

McCarthy, Najand, and Seifert (1990) collected data from the U.S., Germany, and the United
Kingdom for the period January 1962 to September 1987 to test the proxy hypothesis. Using
forecasted instead of actual variables and three methods for estimating expected inflation (Timeseries model, random walk model, and weighted average model), the results failed to show a
significant relationship between forecasted real stock returns and forecasted real activity. In
contrast, the negative relationship between expected real stock returns and expected inflation
persisted even after forecasted real activity was accounted for. In conclusion the authors rejected
the argument of the proxy hypothesis in which the negative relationship between expected
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inflation and expected real stock returns is essentially a proxy for the true positive relationship
between real stock returns and future real activity. The findings are in alignment with the Risk
Premium Hypothesis.

Najand (1991) examined the Risk Premium Hypothesis as possible explanation for the observed
negative relationship between common stock returns and inflation. Empirical evidence for U.S.,
United Kingdom, Germany and France showed a significant positive relationship between
unexpected inflation and the market risk premium for each of the four countries. The findings
suggested that an increase in uncertain inflation raises the market risk premium, which leads to
an increase in the required rate of return on stocks and in turn causes stock prices to fall.

Wei and Wong (1992) analyzed the relationship between stock returns and inflation across
ninteen different industry sectors for the prewar period (1926-1940) and the postwar period
(1961-1985). The evidences indicated that the Proxy hypothesis failed to explain the negative
relationship between stock returns and unexpected inflation in non-natural resource industries for
the postwar period. In addition, the inclusion of future real activity failed to eliminate the
spurious relation between stock returns and unexpected inflation.

Liu, Hsueh and Clayton (1993) tested the three propositions of the Proxy hypothesis: (1) stock
returns are positively related to expected real activity (2) monetary policy is countercyclical and
(3) expected inflation increases as a result of an expected increase in money supply. Analysis of
the data from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada generated a significant
relation between expected inflation and expected real activity but an insignificant relation
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between real stock returns and expected real activity. The proposition that monetary policy is
countercyclical was not supported by the results. In conclusion, the authors argued that the Proxy
Hypothesis fell short of explaining the negative relation between real stock returns and expected
inflation.

Najand and Noronha (1998) researched the existence and the direction of causal relationship
between stock returns, inflation, interest rates, and real activity for Japan using the state space
procedure from January 1977 to December 1994 period. The results pointed out that (1) inflation
has negative and significant effect on real stock returns; (2) stock returns are negatively affected
by an increase in interest rates; (3) inflation and interest rates influence the rate of growth in
industrial production; (4) this result presents a partial support for Fama’s Proxy hypothesis that
inflation predicts real activity.

Kyriacou et al. (2006) measured the equity risk premium for ten industrial countries (Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and United
States) over a period of 132 years from 1871 to 2002, and then used a pooled cross-section and
time-series analysis to investigate the relationship between the equity risk premium and the rate
of inflation. The results indicated that the equity risk premium has been significantly positively
related to the rate of inflation. In particular, the equity risk premium increased significantly in
periods of high inflation rates such as during the two world wars and the two oil price shocks in
the 1970s. The results presented a strong argument for the Risk Premium Hypothesis that
uncertainty about monetary policy increases inflation risk, and an unexpected increase in
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inflation causes the market risk premium to rise, resulting in an increase in the required rate of
return on stocks. The increase in the required rate of return causes stock prices to fall.

MODEL AD VARIABLE COSTRUCTIO

The purpose of this section is to develop a model to study the impact of uncertain inflation on the
equity risk premium. The model will provide a basis for empirical testing for the impact of
uncertain inflation on risky assets. The following assumptions are made to derive the model:

(1) Investors are risk averse and aspire to maximize a single period expected utility of
real terminal wealth.
(2) Investors have homogenous expectations with respect to the rate of assets returns and
price changes.
(3) Returns on assets and price change follow continuous time stochastic (Weiner)
processes.

The first assumption implies that the individuals’ utility functions are assumed to be strictly
concave. This implies that: (1) they always prefer more wealth to less (the marginal utility of
wealth is positive, MU(W)>0), and (2) their marginal utility of wealth decreases as they have
more and more wealth (dMU(W)/dW<0). Also since all investors maximize the expected utility
of their end of period wealth, the model is implicitly a one period model.
The second assumption implies that investors make decisions based on an identical opportunity
set. In other words, no one can be fooled because everyone has the same information at the same
time.
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The last assumption implies that (a) the capital market are assumed to be open all the time, and
therefore economic agents have the opportunity to trade continuously, (b) asset prices traded in
speculative markets satisfy the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” of Fama (1970) and Samuelson
(1965). Namely, assets are priced so that the stochastic processes describing the unanticipated
parts of their expected value are martingale. The notion that stochastic processes is martingale is
generally accepted by financial economists (see for example; Fama (1965), Mandelbrot (1966)).
A martingale is stochastic process (Xi), where for all i = 1,2…
1. E (| X i |)〈∞ ; and
2. E ( X i +1 / X 1 ,..., X i ) = X i

This is often called a “fair game” since the expected future value of a variable is equal to its most
recent realization. In a market characterized by risk averse investors, the martingale model is
appropriate if the arbitrage profits are to be eliminated. A proof for this proposition is provided
by Samuelson (1965). Markets characterized by the absence of arbitrage profits are generally
accepted in the finance literature. If investors are risk averse, the appropriate arbitrage arguments
deal not with “profits” of expected returns, but rather with expected utility. It is further assumed
that the asset returns are generated by diffusion processes with continuous sample paths and that
returns are serially independent and identically distributed through time, i.e., that prices follow a
geometric Brownian motion or Wiener process, and hence the prices are log normally
distributed.
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The general Wiener process x is described by the following stochastic differential equation. This
equation is often used as a model of the rate of return on stocks. See for example Merton (1973,
1978), and Friend, Landskroner, and Losq (1976) among others.
dx = adt + bdz

(11)

Where dz = ε dt , ε = a standard normal variable with expected value of zero and variance of 1
and a and b are constants. The process is a Wiener process with drift a and variance b2. The
expected value of dx is adt. The drift, a, is often called the expected instantaneous rate of change
of x.

Following Fischer (1975), suppose that the rate of inflation is stochastic and the price level is
described by:

dp
= π = E (π )dt + sπ dz
dt

(12)

Where dz = ε dt as mentioned before, with ε a serially uncorrelated and normally distributed
random variable with zero mean and unit variance, that is, z is a Wiener process. Thus over an
interval dt, expected inflation is ε (π ) and its variance is sπ2 . Therefore, the standard deviation of
the Wiener process of price changes ( sπ ) represents uncertain inflation. Substituting for dz,
equation (12) can be written as:

π = E (π )dt + sπ ε π dt

Similarly, the dynamic of the real return on equity is described as:

(13)
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rs = E (rs )dt + s s dz s

(14)

where E (rs ) is the expected return on equity per unit of time. Since this research is concerned
about the effect of uncertain price change on the stock returns, another term should be added to
equation (14) which reflects this effect. This is permissible, as Merton (1975) points out, as long
as the added term reflects a specific additional source of uncertainty.

rs = E (rs )dt + s s dz s + β s sπ dzπ

(15)

In equation (15) ss is the stochastic component of asset returns which is independent of uncertain
price change, i.e., E (ε s ε π ) = 0 and β s = cov(rs , π ) / sπ2 . Substituting for dz:

rs = E (rs )dt + s s dz s + β s sπ ε π dt

(16)

In equation (16) β s measure the degree of the real stock returns with respect to uncertain price
changes.

Following Fischer (1975), the return generating process for the risk-free asset is defined as:

rF = ( R F − π + sπ2 )dt

(17)

where rF is the real return on the risk-free asset and RF is the nominal return on the risk free
asset.
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Next, following Friend, Landskroner, and Losq (1976), the real wealth dynamic for the investors
is derived. It should be pointed out that Friend, Landskroner, and Losq derive the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) adjusted for inflation. However, this study derives the effect of uncertain
inflation on the risk premium. Assuming the investors are rational, they adjust their portfolio
upon the arrival of new information about any changes in the price level. The real wealth
dynamic for the kth investor may be written in a stochastic differential equation form:

Wk ,t + dt = Wk ,t (1 + τ Fk rF dt + τ sk rs dt )

(18)

= Wk ,t + (τ Fk rF dt + τ sk rs dt )Wk ,t

where Wk ,t = the wealth of the kth investor at time t;

rF = the real risk-free rate of return;

τ sk = the proportion of the wealth invested in stocks by the kth investor; and
τ Fk = the proportion of the wealth invested in the risk-free rate by the kth investor.

The investor’s budget constraint is defined as:

τ sk + τ Fk = 1

(19)

By substituting equation (19) into equation (18), we get:

Wk ,t + dt = Wk ,t + [rF dt + τ sk (rs − rF )dt ]Wk ,t

(20)

Differentiating the expected utility of the final real wealth, Wk ,t + dt , with respect to τ sk , the first
order condition for the maximum is derived.
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E[u ' (Wk ,t + dt )(rs − rF )dt ] = 0

(21)

Expanding the marginal utility of real wealth function in a Taylor series about Wk ,t , equation
(22) is obtained:

u ' (Wk ,t + dt ) = u ' (Wk ,t ) + u" (Wk ,t )(Wk ,t + dt − Wk ,t ) + ϕ

(22)

where ϕ is the remaining terms in the Taylor series expansion. Pratt (1964) assumes that second
order and higher terms are insignificant ( ϕ = 0 ). By finding the value of ( Wk ,t + dt − Wk ,t ) from
equation (20) and inserting into equation (22) and ignoring ϕ , we get:

u ' (Wk ,t + dt ) = u ' (Wk ,t ) + u" (Wk ,t )(Wk ,t )[rF dt + τ sk (rs − rF )dt ]

(23)

By substituting equation (23) into equation (21),

u ' (Wk ,t ) E (rs − rF )dt + u" (Wk ,t )Wk ,t E[{rF dt + τ sk (rs − rF )dt}( rs − rF )dt ] = 0 (24)

Since E[rF dt (rs − rF )dt ] = cov(rF , rs − rF )dt and E[{(rs − rF )dt}2 ] = var(rs − rF )dt , equation
(24) becomes:

u ' (Wk ,t ) E (rs − rF )dt + u" (Wk ,t )Wk ,t cov(rF , rs − rF )dt + τ sk var(rs − rF )dt = 0 (25)

Equation (25) can be written in the following form:

E (rs − rF ) = C k [cov(rF , rs − rF )] + τ sk var(rs − rF )

(26)
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where C k = −Wk ,t {u" (Wk ,t ) / u ' (Wk ,t )} is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.

Following the aggregation method used by Friend, Landskroner, and Losq (1976), equation (26)
is aggregated over individual investors according to their proportions of initial wealth to the total
initial

wealth.

To

derive

market

equilibrium

condition

let

Γk = Wk ,t / ∑ Wk ,t

and Ω = (∑ Γk / C k ) . By multiplying both sides of equation (26) by Ω / C k and aggregating over
all investors, the market equilibrium is derived.

E (rs − rF ) = Ω[cov(rF , rs − rF )] + τ sk var(rs − rF )

(27)

In equation (27), Ω represents the market price of risk and τ sk is the total value of common stock
to the total value of all assets. Furthermore, it can be shown from return generating functions
[equation (16) and (17)] that:
cov(rF , rs − rF ) = sπ2 ( β s − 1)

(28)

var(rs − rF ) = s s2 + sπ2 ( β s − 1) 2

(29)

and

By substituting equation (28) and (29) into (27):

E (rs − rF ) = Ω[ s s2 + sπ2 ( β s2 − β s )]τ s

(30)

Following Ross (1976), it is assumed that the net supply of the risk-free asset is zero, i.e., τ s = 1 ;
then equation (30) becomes:

E (rs − rF ) = Ω[ s s2 + sπ2 ( β s2 − β s )]

(31)
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by taking the first derivative of (31) with respect to sπ2 ,

dE (rs − rF ) / dsπ2 = Ω[( β s2 − β s )] > 0

(32)

Thus, the risk premium will rise with respect to an increase in uncertain price changes since the
negative β s (the negative relationship between stock returns and unexpected inflation) is well
documented (see Linter (1975), Bodie (1976), Fama and Schwert (1977), among others).

The Fischer equations for stock returns and returns on risk-free assets are:

E (rs ) = E ( R s ) − E (π )

(33)

E (rF ) = E ( RF ) − E (π )

(34)

where R s is the nominal return on stocks and R F is the nominal return on risk-free rate.
Subtracting equation (34) from equation (33),

E (rs − rF ) = E ( Rs − R F )

(35)

Thus equation (31) becomes:

E ( R s − R F ) = Ω( s s2 ) + [Ω( β s2 − β s )]( sπ2 )

(36)

Equation (36) states that the equity risk premium is affected by the risk of common stocks which
is independent of price changes ( s s2 ), the standard deviation of price changes with respect to
inflation uncertainty ( sπ ) , and the degree of responsiveness of the stock returns with respect to
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uncertain price changes ( β s ). This equation is the basis of my empirical study for measuring the
effect of uncertain inflation on the market risk premium.

The model developed in this chapter provides an explanation for the effect of uncertain inflation
on stock returns consisting of the following argument. An increase in uncertain inflation
increases the market risk premium. This increase in the market risk premium leads to an increase
in the required rate of return on stocks, which in turn causes the stock prices to decline.

DATA AD ESTIMATIO PROCEDURE

To test for the relationship between the expected ERP and the unexpected inflation a least
squares regression is run for the following model

ERPt = α 1VIFt + α 2VRS t

(37)

Where ERPt is the expected risk premium at time t, VIFt is the measure of variability of
uncertain inflation and VRS t is the measure of variability of stock returns. α1 is equal to the term
[Ω( β s2 − β s )] from equation (36), and α 2 is equal to the term Ω from equation (36).

Equation (37) states that the expected ERP is affected by the variance of price changes with
respect to inflation uncertainty and the variance of common stocks’ returns. As such, if α1 >0
then ERP is related to variability of uncertain inflation, and if α 2 >0 then ERP is related to
variability of stocks’ returns.
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For estimation purpose, I obtained monthly and quarterly ERP calculated as the difference
between the returns on the S&P 500 and the TB10 rate. The VRS is the monthly stock market
volatility index (VIX) measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. VINF is extracted
from the Michigan Survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan. The survey provides a measure for the volatility of unexpected inflation calculated as
the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile of the observations. Following
Sinclair (2010), this measure is adopted as a proxy for VINF. Data is monthly, 312 observations,
for the period 1990 to 2015. Table 15 gives a brief summary of the data.
[Insert Table 15 here]

Table 15 shows that monthly ERPs are negatively skewed with kurtosis value much larger than
three (the kurtosis value for normal distribution). This indicates that ERP has a long left tail with
peaked (leptokurtic) distribution relative to the normal. VINF and VRS have positive skewness
and larger than three kurtosis values. This indicates that the two variables have a long right tail
with peaked distributions relative to the normal. The Jarque-Bera statistics rejects the null
hypothesis of normal distribution for the three series, the ERP, the VRS, and the VINF.

To determine if any of the variables needs to be transformed before I estimate the model I run an
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to check for stationarity. The results of the ADF test,
presented in table 16, indicate that the ERP and the VRS are stationary at the level, while the
VINF is nonstationary at the level but stationary at the first difference. Thus, the first difference
of the volatility of expected inflation (DVINF) is utilized in model’s estimation.
[Insert Table 16 here]
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Since expected ERP is not directly observed, the next step is to estimate the expected ERP
(EERP). The correlogram of ERP which plots the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial
autocorrelation function (PACF) is examined to determine a suitable Autoregressive Moving
Average model (ARMA) for generating EERP. The Autoregressive term (AR) represents the
dependency among successive observations and the Moving Average term (MA) represents the
persistence of a random shock from one observation to the other. Few models are estimated, the
model with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Criterion (SC) is
selected after passing certain diagnostic tests that include: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation
LM test, Jarque-Bera test for normality, the QQ-plots, and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity.

Table 17 table provides the results for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz
Criterion (SC), Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test, Jarque-Bera test for normality, the
and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity. The results indicate that MA(1) model is the best
model based on the AIC, SC criteria. A constant term is included in the MA(1) model to account
for a non-zero mean value. The EERPs are then approximated by the fitted values in the MA(1)
model. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test and ARCH LM test for
homoskedasticity indicate no serial correlation and no heteroskedasticity. Jarque-Bera test for
Normality rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals of all models are normally distributed.
This is confirmed by the QQ-plots of residuals in figure 7. The residuals QQ-plots do not remain
straight.
[Insert Table 17 here]
[Insert Figure 7 here]
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RESULTS

Results for the Ordinary Least Squares Regressions

Four Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are run to test for Equation (37). If α1 >0 then
EERP is related to variability of uncertain inflation, and if α 2 >0 then EERP is related to
variability of stocks’ returns. Four OLS regressions are estimated. OLS1 regress the EERP on the
difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS2 regress the EERP on the difference of the VINF, the
lagged difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS3 is identical to OLS1 except that it accounts
for recession periods in the estimation sample by introducing a dummy variable that take the
value of 1 if there is a recession and the value of 0 if there is no recession. OLS4 is identical to
OLS2 except that it accounts for recession periods in the estimation sample by introducing a
dummy variable that take the value of 1 if there is a recession and the value of 0 if there is no
recession. This table provides the results the four OLS regression of the EERP on the VINF and
VRS. The results for the four OLS regressions along with the measure of Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Criterion (SC), the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the BreuschGodfrey Serial Correlation LM test, and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity, are presented in
table 18.
[Insert Table 18 here]

The results from OLS1 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is negative and statistically
insignificant, while the coefficient of the VRS is positive and statistically significant at one
percent level. The adjusted R-squared is zero (negative). Based on these results, I conclude that
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the EERP is not related to variability of uncertain inflation, but related to variability of stocks’
returns.

The results from OLS2 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is negative and statistically
insignificant at the level, and negative and statistically significant at one percent at the lagged
level. The coefficient of the VRS is positive and statistically significant at one percent level.

The results from OLS3 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is positive and statistically
insignificant at the level in recession periods, and negative and statistically insignificant at the
level in non-recession periods. The coefficient of the VRS is positive and statistically significant
at one percent level in non-recession periods and negative and statistically significant at one
percent level in recession periods. The adjusted R-squared is positive and equal to 2.4 percent.

The results from OLS4 indicate that the coefficient of the VIN is positive but statistically
insignificant at the level in recession periods. The VIN coefficient is negative and statistically
insignificant at the lagged level in non-recession periods. The VIN coefficient is negative and
statistically insignificant at level in periods of non-recession but negative and statistically
significant at five percent at the lagged level. The coefficient of the VRS is negative and
statistically significant at one percent level in periods of recessions but positive and statistically
significant at one percent level in non-recession periods. The adjusted R-squared is positive and
equal to 4.5 percent.
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The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Criterion (SC) indicate that OLS4
represents an improvement in the estimation model for the EERP on the VINF and VRS. The
Jarque-Bera test for normality indicates that the residuals do not follow a normal distribution and
are negatively skewed with kurtosis value much larger than three. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial
Correlation LM test, and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity indicate that the residuals are not
serially correlated and do not suffer from heteroskedasticity.

COCLUSIO

The relationship between the stock market returns, the unexpected inflation and the market
volatility have been noticeably studied in the financial literatures. With some authors arguing
that the relationship between the stock market returns and unexpected inflation is negative, while
others stating that the relationship is positive. In this chapter, I develop a theoretical model to test
for the relationship between the expected market risk premium, the unexpected inflation
volatility, and the stock market volatility. The model predicts that the relationship between the
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is positive as is the
relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market volatility.
The testing results for the four regression models indicate that the relationship between the
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is in general negative and
insignificant even after accounting for recessionary periods. This is a clear indication that the
stock market fully hedge against inflation in times of recession and in times of economic
expansion. The results validate the Proxy Hypothesis theory of Fama (1981) that the negative
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relationship between stock return and expected inflation is a proxy for the positive relationship
between stock return and future real economic variables.

On the other hand, the relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market
volatility is more ambiguous. The results of the OLS regressions indicate that the expected
equity risk premium is positively correlated with the stock market volatility in times of nonrecessionary periods but negatively correlated in times of recessionary periods. On average a 1
percent increase in market volatility in times of economic expansion will increase the expected
equity risk premium by 0.02 percent monthly (0.24 percent annually). While in times of
recessions, a 1 percent increase in market volatility will decrease the expected equity risk
premium by 0.012 percent monthly (0.14 percent annually). The results can be explained by the
fact that investors perceive an increase in market volatility as a sign of a change in the direction
of economic conditions. During recession periods, an increase in market volatility may be
recognized as a sign that economic condition are about to improve and therefore investors will
demand lower risk premiums for their future investments. Whereas in times of economic
expansion, an increase in market volatility may be recognized as a sign that an economic
downturn is in the horizon and in the process investors will demand higher risk premiums for
their future investments.
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Table 15. Summary Statistics of Monthly Variables Used in Testing the Impact of Stock
Market Volatility and Unexpected Inflation Volatility on Expected Equity Risk Premium in
Equation 37

Equation (37)

ERPt = α 0 + α 1VIFt + α 2VRS t

This table provides the summary statistics of the monthly variables used for estimating the
relationship expressed in equation 37 between the expected ERP, the stock market volatility and
the unexpected inflation volatility. Where ERP is the ERP calculated as the difference between
the return on the S&P 500 and the TB10 rate, VINF is the unexpected inflation volatility
measure from the Michigan Survey, and VRS is stock market volatility measured by the VIX
index provided by the CBOE.

Monthly obesrvations for the period 1990M01 to 2015M12
RE
TB10
ERP
VINF
VIX
Mean
0.008057 0.003943
0.004114 3.909295 19.83422
Median
0.0107
0.0039
0.00705
3.7 17.77045
Maximum
0.1229
0.0071
0.1205
7 62.63947
Minimum
-0.202
0.0013
-0.2051
3 10.81762
Std. Dev.
0.035485 0.001468
0.035488 0.651841 7.640597
Skewness
-0.968878 0.101921
-0.952368 1.597127 1.972798
Kurtosis
7.656295 2.183393
7.556509 6.713893 9.380319
Jarque-Bera
330.6677 9.209194
317.0673 311.9514 731.5907
Probability
0 0.010006
0
0
0
Sum
2.5139
1.2302
1.2837
1219.7 6188.278
Sum Sq. Dev.
0.391606 0.000671
0.391665
132.143 18155.78
Observations
312
312
312
312
312
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Table 16. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test for Unit Root
This table provides the results for the ADF test for unit for the variables ERP, VRS, and VINF.
The null hypothesis is the variable has a unit root. The results indicate that the ERP and the VRS
are stationary at the level, while the VINF is nonstationary at the level but stationary at the first
difference.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on ERP
t-Statistic
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
-13.991
Test critical values:
1% level
-3.451214
5% level
-2.870621
10% level
-2.571679
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on VRS
t-Statistic
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
-4.611007
Test critical values:
1% level
-3.451351
5% level
-2.870682
10% level
-2.571711
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on VINF
t-Statistic
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
-3.135793
Test critical values:
1% level
-3.451491
5% level
-2.870743
10% level
-2.571744

Prob.*
0

Prob.*
0.0002

Prob.*
0.025
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Table 17. ARMA Models Identification for Unexpected ERP
This table provides the results for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz
Criterion (SC), Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test, Jarque-Bera test for normality, the
and ARCH LM test for homoskedasticity.
ARMA Models
ERP C AR1

ERP C MA1

ERP C AR1 MA1

ERP C MA1 MA 2

Akaike info criterion

-3.881316

-3.884969

-3.876951

Schwarz criterion

-3.857266

-3.860975

605.5447

608.0551

-3.871703
1.982721

Log likelihood
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

ERP C MA1 MA6

-3.87868

-3.889109

-3.840875

-3.84269

-3.853119

605.8658

608.0741

609.701

-3.875379

-3.862531

-3.864296

-3.874725

2.00299

2.000835

1.998727

1.98393

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
Obs*R-squared
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

2.432273

0.995529

2.164531

1.341503

0.344962

0.2964

0.6079

0.3388

0.5113

0.8416

Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH
Obs*R-squared
Prob. Chi-Square(1)

1.140232

1.212228

1.303782

1.272041

1.902875

0.2856

0.2709

0.2535

0.2594

0.1678

-0.721969

-0.712996

-0.774414

Jarque-Bera Test for Normality
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability

-0.698576

-0.707161

7.340533

7.206851

7.18424

7.186233

6.776177

269.433

256.0728

253.8903

254.254

216.559

0

0

0

0

0
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Table 18. Results for the OLS regressions of EERP on the VIF and VRS
This table provides the results the four OLS regression of the EERP on the VINF and VRS.
OLS1 regress the EERP on the difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS2 regress the EERP on
the difference of the VINF, the lagged difference of the VINF and the VRS. OLS3 is identical to
OLS1 except that it accounts for recession periods in the estimation sample by introducing a
dummy variable that take the value of 1 if there is a recession and the value of 0 if there is no
recession. OLS4 is identical to OLS2 except that it accounts for recession periods in the
estimation sample by introducing a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if there is a recession
and the value of 0 if there is no recession.

The mean equations for OLS regression are:
For OLS1: EERP = α1 d(VINF) + α2 VRS + ε
For OLS2: EERP = α1 d(VINF) + α2 d(VINF(-1)) + α3 VRS + ε
For OLS3: EERP = α1 RECES*d(VINF) + α2 (1-RECES)*d(VINF) + α3 RECES*VRS +
α4 (1-RECES)*VRS + ε
For OLS4: EERP = α1 RECES*d(VINF) + α2 RECES*d(VINF(-1)) + α3 (1-RECES)*d(VINF) +
α4 (1-RECES)*d(VINF(-1)) + α5 (RECES*VRS) + α6 (1-RECES)*VRS + ε

α1
α2

OLS1
-0.000148
(0.900500)
0.000134
(0.000000)

OLS2
-0.000994
(0.415300)
-0.003375
(0.005900)
0.000137
(0.000000)

OLS3
0.001440
(0.345700)
-0.001357
(0.399300)
-0.000124
(0.005000)
0.000221
(0.000000)

-0.126250
-0.129894
-6.604999
-6.580949
1.798807
-1.057003
8.167322
403.914300
(0.000000)

-0.099706
-0.106871
-6.621802
-6.585641
1.799869
-0.963611
7.728397
336.762300
(0.000000)

0.023839
0.014300
-6.735158
-6.687058
2.005705
-0.293095
6.546408
167.429900
(0.000000)

0.001245
(0.428300)
-0.000750
(0.642300)
-0.002401
(0.151700)
-0.004170
(0.011300)
-0.000120
(0.006800)
0.000219
(0.000000)
0.045276
0.029574
-6.743823
-6.671503
2.009547
-0.298282
6.460551
159.279300
(0.000000)

(1.000000)

(1.000000)

(1.000000)

(1.000000)

(0.129600)

(0.260100)

(0.669200)

(0.549900)

α3
α4
α5
α6
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test:
Prob. Chi-Square(2)
ARCH Heteroskedasticity Test
Prob. Chi-Square(1)

Note: P-Value are reported in parentheses

OLS4

102

Figure 7. QQ-Plots for ARMA Models Identification for Unexpected ERP
This figures graph the QQ-Plots for ARMA Models Identification for Unexpected ERP
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CHAPTER IV
COCLUSIO

The equity risk premium (ERP) is an essential component of any asset pricing model both for
academics and practitioners alike. Nevertheless, the financial literature does not accord much
attention to the ERP estimation issues (Damodaran, 2015). Theoretically, the ERP is the return
on equity in excess of the risk-free rate. Since future equity market returns are not discernible at
the current time, it is the expected ERP that investors are concerned with. As intuitive as the
concept of ERP seems, in practice it does present a number of challenges. Among academics,
there are striking differences to what the ERP value actually is. Values vary from as low as 2
percent to as high as 13 percent (Welch, 2000). The wide variation in the estimates of the ERP
could be explained by variation in sample period, variation in variables measurement, and
variation in measurement techniques. There are three main approaches for estimating the ERP.
The first and the most widely used among academics and estimation services such as Ibbotson
Associates is the historical premium approach. It consists of estimating the expected ERP by
assessing the historical premium of past returns on equities over risk free assets. The second
approach is a survey based approach that consists of surveying a sample of managers and
investors about their future expectation for the ERP. The third approach is what Damodaran calls
the “implied premium” approach, and it consists of estimating the ERP based on the value of
traded assets today.

In the second chapter I explored four of the most commonly cited models in literature for
estimating the ERP: the Historical Mean of Realized Returns Model (HMRRM), the Dividend
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Discount Model (DDM), the Free Cash Flow Model (FCFM), and the Sharpe Ratio Model
(SRM). The results indicate that the estimates of the ERP, both historical and implied, vary
considerably depending on (a) the variable of choice for the risk free rate; (b) the selection and
the length of the estimation period; (c) and the estimation method. The DDM and the FCFM
produce estimates for the implied ERP that are below the historical estimates, while the SRM
produces implied ERP values that are usually higher than the historical values of the ERP.

The post 2008 financial crisis period produces estimates for the historical ERP that are slightly
higher or lower than the implied ERP estimates for the FCFM. This result suggests that the
subprime mortgage crisis may have resulted in market self-correction and in investor reevaluation of the risk aversion level. In addition, the implied ERP estimates for the three models
are more volatile than the historical ERP. In particular, estimates of the implied ERP from the
SRM tend to overshoot the historical ERP estimates during periods of high volatility and fall
below the historical level during periods of low stock market volatility.

In conclusion the choice between historical ERP estimates and implied ERP estimates is a
question of belief. Models for the implied ERP assume that markets are efficient and securities
are correctly priced. Therefore if one believes in market efficiency then implied ERP is the best
option for predicting future returns. On the other hand, if one is skeptical about the efficiency
assumption and believes in market timing then the historical ERP is a better option.

The third chapter explored the relationship between the expected ERP and macroeconomic
variables. The relationship between the stock market returns, the unexpected inflation and the
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market volatility have been noticeably studied in the financial literatures. With some authors
arguing that the relationship between the stock market returns and unexpected inflation is
negative, while others stating that the relationship is positive. I developed a theoretical model to
test for the relationship between the expected market risk premium, the unexpected inflation
volatility, and the stock market volatility. The model predicts that the relationship between the
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is positive as is the
relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market volatility.

The testing results for the four regression models indicate that the relationship between the
expected market risk premium and the unexpected inflation volatility is in general negative and
insignificant even after accounting for recessionary periods. This is a clear indication that the
stock market fully hedge against inflation in times of recession and in times of economic
expansion. The results validate the Proxy Hypothesis theory of Fama (1981) that the negative
relationship between stock return and expected inflation is a proxy for the positive relationship
between stock return and future real economic variables.

On the other hand, the relationship between the expected market risk premium and the market
volatility is more ambiguous. The results of the OLS regressions indicate that the expected
equity risk premium is positively correlated with the stock market volatility in times of nonrecessionary periods but negatively correlated in times of recessionary periods. On average a 1
percent increase in market volatility in times of economic expansion will increase the expected
equity risk premium by 0.02 percent monthly (0.24 percent annually). While in times of
recessions, a 1 percent increase in market volatility will decrease the expected equity risk
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premium by 0.012 percent monthly (0.14 percent annually). The results can be explained by the
fact that investors perceive an increase in market volatility as a sign of a change in the direction
of economic conditions. During recession periods, an increase in market volatility may be
recognized as a sign that economic condition are about to improve and therefore investors will
demand lower risk premiums for their future investments. Whereas in times of economic
expansion, an increase in market volatility may be recognized as a sign that an economic
downturn is in the horizon and in the process investors will demand higher risk premiums for
their future investments.
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